Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41306118›Full record

ArticleEvolutionary human sciences2025

Cultural evolution in the laboratory: evolution of cooperative altruistic punishing.

William M Baum, Peter J Richerson

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Evolutionary human sciences, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

William M BaumDepartment of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California, Davis, CA, USA.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7070-5223
Peter J RichersonDepartment of Environmental Science and Policy, University of California, Davis, CA, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Culture consists of practices - behaviour patterns - shared by members of a group. Some attempts to demonstrate evolution of cultural practices in the laboratory have shown evolution of material products, such as paper aeroplanes. Some attempts have shown evolution of actual group behaviour. The present experiments demonstrated evolution of group coordination across generations in punishing defection in a public-goods game. Cost of punishing defection varied across replicates that consisted of series of groups (generations) of 10 undergraduates each. Each generation played the game anonymously for 10 rounds and could write messages to the other participants and punish defection every round. The effectiveness of punishment depended on the number of participants choosing to punish. In Experiment 1, cultural transmission from generation to generation consisted of written advice from one generation read aloud to the next generation. In Experiment 2, transmission from generation to generation consisted of having some participants return from the previous group. The cost of punishing varied across replicates: zero, one, two or five cents. In both experiments, the evolution of altruistic punishing was strongly dependent on the cost of punishing. The results add to plausibility of studying evolution of complex behaviour patterns like cooperation in the laboratory.

Indexed as

Altruismcooperationcultural evolutionmicro-societypublic-goods gamepunishment

Identifiers

PMID41306118
PMCPMC12645323

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.