ArticleFrontiers in public health2025
Human anthrax in a non-epizootic area: epidemiological investigation and response based on One Health-Chengdu, China.
Article in Frontiers in public health, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.
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8 authors.
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Abstract
Background: Anthrax, caused by Methods: A multidisciplinary team applied the "One Health" approach to investigate the outbreak. The investigation included case details, symptoms, laboratory results, potential sources of infection, suspected contaminated environments, local natural landscapes related to animal husbandry practices, disease incidence rates, slaughtering process, and vaccination history. A risk assessment focused on human, animal, and environmental factors to guide containment measures. Results: Two cutaneous anthrax cases were confirmed, epidemiologically linked to the unprotected handling of cattle imported from Aba Prefecture. Conclusion: This outbreak underscores the systemic risk of anthrax in non-epizootic urban areas due to unregulated or poorly monitored livestock trade and poor farm biosecurity. While the One Health approach enabled effective containment, it revealed critical gaps in market oversight and diagnostics. Key recommendations include implementing integrated surveillance, mandatory electronic tracing, training for healthcare workers, and stricter quarantine enforcement to prevent zoonotic spillover.
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