Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41244035›Full record

ArticleWellcome open research2025

The Problem (and the Value) of Radical Moral Disagreement.

David Lyreskog, Dominic Wilkinson, Caesar A Atuire, Milly Farrell, Errol Francis, Mark Harrison, Patricia Kingori, Julian Savulescu, Ilina Singh, Michael Parker

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Wellcome open research, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

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0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

10 authors.

David LyreskogNEUROSEC, Department of of Psychiatry, University of Oxford, Oxford, England, UK.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6888-6272
Dominic WilkinsonUehiro Oxford Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, England, UK.
Caesar A AtuireUniversity of Oxford Nuffield Department of Medicine, Oxford, England, UK.
Milly FarrellUniversity of Oxford Ethox Centre, Oxford, England, UK.
Errol FrancisCulture&, London, UK.
Mark HarrisonPandemic Sciences Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, England, UK.
Patricia KingoriUniversity of Oxford Ethox Centre, Oxford, England, UK.
Julian SavulescuUehiro Oxford Institute, University of Oxford, Oxford, England, UK.
Ilina SinghNEUROSEC, Department of of Psychiatry, University of Oxford, Oxford, England, UK.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4497-3587
Michael ParkerUniversity of Oxford Ethox Centre, Oxford, England, UK.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7054-4711

Funding

Wellcome Trust
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Background: Contemporary societies increasingly face deep, persistent moral conflicts that resist resolution through conventional dialogue and democratic processes. While the conceptual features of moral disagreement have been extensively analysed in philosophy, there has been inadequate attention to the full complexity of moral disagreements as social and cultural phenomena. This paper introduces and analyses the concept of "radical moral disagreement" (RMD) as a phenomenon requiring urgent scholarly attention. Methods: We conducted a conceptual analysis drawing on examples from contemporary moral conflicts including abortion debates, climate action, and pandemic responses. We identified and analysed seven defining characteristics of RMDs through theoretical examination and comparison with moral disagreements of other kinds. We developed a preliminary conceptual framework and outlined research questions spanning philosophy, history, sociology, psychology, and media studies. Results: We identified seven key characteristics that distinguish RMDs from ordinary moral disagreements: collision of incompatible values requiring resolution e.g. in policy decisions, intransigence even under ideal conditions for resolution, emotional intensity that precludes compromise, progressive polarisation of positions, censure that limits public discourse, widespread social disruption, and contested epistemologies regarding evidence and expertise. These characteristics are primarily scalar in nature, suggesting RMDs exist along a continuum rather than as categorical states. We demonstrated that RMDs can arise around a wide range of issues when they become entangled with identity, power, and risk within specific social contexts. Conclusions: RMDs represent complex moral and social phenomena that, while potentially destabilising social cohesion and democratic governance, may also catalyse moral progress when properly understood and navigated. The paper describes a theoretical foundation for studying RMDs and outlines relevant research questions requiring attention, spanning philosophy, history, sociology, psychology, and media studies. We propose that understanding RMDs is essential for developing effective approaches to coexistence in pluralistic yet polarised societies.

Indexed as

Democratic DiscourseEthical PluralismMoral EpistemologyPolarizationRadical Moral DisagreementSocial CohesionValue Conflict

Identifiers

PMID41244035
PMCPMC12612615

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.