Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41209377›Full record

ArticleAI & society2025

Virtues for AI.

Jakob Ohlhorst

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in AI & society, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Jakob OhlhorstVrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Virtue theory is a natural approach toward the design of artificially intelligent systems, given that the design of artificial intelligence essentially aims at designing agents with excellent dispositions. This has led to a lively research programme to develop artificial virtues. However, this research programme has until now had a narrow focus on moral virtues in an Aristotelian mould. While Aristotelian moral virtue has played a foundational role in the field, it unduly constrains the possibilities of virtue theory for artificial intelligence. This paper aims to remedy this limitation. Philosophers have developed a rich tradition investigating virtues, their normative domains and their structure. Drawing on this tradition, I propose a three-dimensional classification system of possible artificial virtues: virtues can be classified according to the

Indexed as

Artificial intelligenceArtificial moral agentsArtificial virtueConnectionismVirtueVirtue epistemology

Identifiers

PMID41209377
PMCPMC12594676

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.