Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41183115›Full record

ArticlePloS one2025

Stability analysis of heterogeneous oligopoly games of increasing players: A computational approach.

Ruirui Hou, Xiaoliang Li, Wenshuang Wan

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

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0citing papers in PubMed
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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

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2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

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5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Ruirui HouSchool of Management, Guangdong University of Science and Technology, Dongguan, China.
Xiaoliang LiSchool of Business, Guangzhou College of Technology and Business, Guangzhou, China.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6468-3443
Wenshuang WanSchool of Management, Guangdong University of Science and Technology, Dongguan, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In this paper, we study an oligopolistic market endowed with an isoelastic demand function and a quadratic cost function, where heterogeneous firms coexist and produce the same product. We create new games by adding additional heterogeneous firms one after the other, and we examine the relative size of the stability region as the number of heterogeneous firms increases. For each model studied, we use the cylindrical algebraic decomposition method to analytically investigate the conditions for the local stability of the Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We find that the stability regions become larger as the number of heterogeneous firms involved increases. We also perform numerical simulations to investigate complex dynamics, such as periodic orbits and chaos, when the equilibrium loses its stability. Furthermore, we investigate the case of distinct cost parameters through numerical simulations and find that the dynamics seem more complicated than the case of identical cost parameters.

Indexed as

Computer SimulationGame TheoryModels, EconomicHumans

Identifiers

PMID41183115
PMCPMC12582497

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.