Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41094879›Full record

ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2025

FortiNIDS: Defending Smart City IoT Infrastructures Against Transferable Adversarial Poisoning in Machine Learning-Based Intrusion Detection Systems.

Abdulaziz Alajaji

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

1 author.

Abdulaziz AlajajiInformation Systems Department, College of Computer and Information Sciences, King Saud University, Riyadh 11451, Saudi Arabia.ORCID 0000-0001-6725-4054

Funding

King Saud University ORF-2025-1464
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

In today's digital era, cyberattacks are rapidly evolving, rendering traditional security mechanisms increasingly inadequate. The adoption of AI-based Network Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS) has emerged as a promising solution, due to their ability to detect and respond to malicious activity using machine learning techniques. However, these systems remain vulnerable to adversarial threats, particularly data poisoning attacks, in which attackers manipulate training data to degrade model performance. In this work, we examine tree classifiers, Random Forest and Gradient Boosting, to model black box poisoning attacks. We introduce FortiNIDS, a robust framework that employs a surrogate neural network to generate adversarial perturbations that can transfer between models, leveraging the transferability of adversarial examples. In addition, we investigate defense strategies designed to improve the resilience of NIDS in smart city Internet of Things (IoT) settings. Specifically, we evaluate adversarial training and the Reject on Negative Impact (RONI) technique using the widely adopted CICDDoS2019 dataset. Our findings highlight the effectiveness of targeted defenses in improving detection accuracy and maintaining system reliability under adversarial conditions, thereby contributing to the security and privacy of smart city networks.

Indexed as

adversarial machine learningadversarial trainingdata poisoning attacksgradient boostingIoT securityNetwork Intrusion Detection Systems (NIDS)random forestReject on Negative Impact (RONI)smart city securitytransferability

Identifiers

PMID41094879
PMCPMC12526544

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.