Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41036231›Full record

ArticleCentral European journal of operations research2025

Designing a kidney exchange program in Germany: simulations and recommendations.

Itai Ashlagi, Ágnes Cseh, David Manlove, Axel Ockenfels, William Pettersson

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Central European journal of operations research, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
  2. Novel Allocation Strategies Can Boost Kidney Exchange Programs: A Monte Carlo Simulation.Transplant international : official journal of the European Society for Organ Transplantation · 2026
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Itai AshlagiDepartment of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford University, 475 Via Ortega, Stanford, CA 94305 USA.
Ágnes CsehDepartment of Mathematics, University of Bayreuth, Universitätsstraße 30, 95447 Bayreuth, Germany.
David ManloveSchool of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, University Avenue, Glasgow, G12 8QQ UK.
Axel OckenfelsDepartment of Economics, University of Cologne, Universitätsstraße 22a, 50923 Cologne, Germany.
William PetterssonSchool of Computing Science, University of Glasgow, University Avenue, Glasgow, G12 8QQ UK.ORCID 0000-0003-0040-2088

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

We examine some of the opportunities and challenges concerned with establishing a centralized national kidney exchange program in Germany. Despite the many advantages of a national program, without deliberate design and policy intervention, a fragmented kidney exchange program may emerge. We study a number of collaboration strategies, and resulting simulations suggest that transplant centers may find it advantageous not to fully participate, resulting in a net reduction in the number of transplants. These results also suggest that allowing more forms of kidney exchange, such as three-way exchanges and non-directed donations, can significantly increase the number of transplants while making participation in a national program more attractive and thus national coordination and cooperation more robust. We propose a multi-level policy approach that is easy to implement and would promote an efficient German kidney exchange program that benefits recipients, donors and hospitals.

Indexed as

Kidney exchangeMarket designSimulation

Identifiers

PMID41036231
PMCPMC12479653

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.