Evidence map›Paper›PMID 41008289›Full record

ReviewBrain sciences2025

A Call for Conceptual Clarity: "Emotion" as an Umbrella Term Did Not Work-Let's Narrow It Down.

Peter Walla, Angelika Wolman, Georg Northoff

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Brain sciences, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Article
  4. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Peter WallaFaculty of Psychology, Freud CanBeLab, Sigmund Freud Private University, Freudplatz 1, 1020 Vienna, Austria.ORCID 0000-0002-0207-7699
Angelika WolmanCenter for Brain Disorders and Cognitive Sciences, School of Psychology, Shenzhen University, 3688 Nanhai Blvd, Nanshan, Shenzhen 518060, China.ORCID 0000-0003-4389-1934
Georg NorthoffMind, Brain Imaging and Neuroethics Research Unit, University of Ottawa, Institute of Mental Health Research, Royal Ottawa Mental Health Centre, 1145 Carling Avenue, Ottawa, ON K1Z 7K4, Canada.ORCID 0000-0002-5236-0951

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

To cut a long story short, the term "emotion" is predominantly employed as a comprehensive designation, encompassing phenomena such as feelings, affective processing, experiences, expressions, and, on occasion, cognitive processes. This has given rise to a plethora of schools of thought that diverge in their inclusion of these phenomena, not to mention the discordance regarding what emotions belong to the so-called set of discrete emotions in the first place. This is a problem, because clear and operational definitions are paramount for ensuring the comparability of research findings across studies and also across different disciplines. In response to this disagreement, it is here proposed to simplify the definition of the term "emotion", instead of using it as an umbrella term overarching an unclear set of multiple phenomena, which is exactly what left all of us uncertain about the question what an emotion actually is. From an etymological perspective, the simplest suggestion is to understand an emotion as behavior (from the Latin verb 'emovere', meaning to move out, and thus the noun 'emotion' meaning out-movement). This suggests that an emotion should not be understood as something felt, nor as a physiological reaction, or anything including cognition. Instead, emotions should be understood as behavioral outputs (not as information processing), with their connection to feelings being that they convey them. Consider fear, which should not be classified as an emotion, it should be understood as a feeling (fear is felt). The specific body posture, facial expression, and other behavioral manifestations resulting from muscle contractions should be classified as emotions with their purpose being to communicate the felt fear to conspecifics. The underlying causative basis for all that exists is affective processing (i.e., neural activity), and it provides evaluative information to support decision-making. The essence of this model is that if affective processing responds above a certain threshold, chemicals are released, which leads to a feeling (e.g., felt fear) if the respective organism is capable of conscious experience. Finally, the communication of these feelings to conspecifics is happening by emotion-behavior (i.e., emotions). In summary, affective processing guides behavior, and emotions communicate feelings. This perspective significantly simplifies the concept of an emotion and will prevent interchangeable use of emotion-related terms. Last but not least, according to the current model, emotions can also be produced voluntarily in order to feign a certain feeling, which is performed in various social settings. Applications of this model to various fields, including clinical psychology, show how beneficial it is.

Indexed as

affectaffective processingcephalizationcognitive processingconsciousnessemotionfeelingmoodmotivationnon-conscious processingOccam’s razorparsimony

Identifiers

PMID41008289
PMCPMC12467906

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.