ArticlePloS one2025
From self-interest to collective action: The role of defaults in governing common resources.
Article in PloS one, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Authors and funding
4 authors.
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Abstract
Managing shared resources requires balancing personal profit and sustainability. This paper reports on a behavioural experiment testing how extraction defaults-either pro-social or exploitative-impact resource extraction in a common pool resource dilemma (CPRD). We find that an exploitative default increases average extraction compared to a control without a default, while a pro-social default temporarily reduces extraction. The effects of both defaults are temporary, and extraction levels converge to those in the control group, with the pro-social default fading faster. Notably, the influence of defaults depended on individual inclinations, with cooperative individuals extracting more under an exploitative default, and selfish individuals less under a pro-social default. Our findings suggest that while defaults can promote short-term sustainability, their long-term effects are limited, and their effectiveness depends on individual traits.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.