Trial reportPloS one2025
Boosting health provider performance with non-financial incentives: A cluster-randomized controlled trial in Tanzania.
Trial report in PloS one, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. It is linked to trial NCT05525533 (Supporting Young Women's Reproductive Health by Harnessing Prosociality Among Drug Shopkeepers), which is not on this map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
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Supporting Young Women's Reproductive Health by Harnessing Prosociality Among Drug Shopkeepers
Who cites it
0 citing papers in PubMed.
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Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
7 authors.
Funding
Abstract
backgroundNon-financial incentives are frequently used to improve performance among healthcare providers, capitalizing on mission-driven intrinsic pro-social motivation. However, the effectiveness of incentives varies across settings and may depend on whether they are provided privately or publicly. Using a cluster-randomized controlled trial (ClinicalTrials.gov: NCT05525533) among drug shopkeepers in Tanzania, we designed and evaluated the effectiveness of non-financial incentives in boosting provider performance.
methodsWe developed a non-financial incentive that involved providing shopkeepers with monthly reports of aggregated customer feedback compiled from anonymous surveys from young women (15-24) to appeal to shopkeepers' pro-social motivation for helping these customers. We randomized whether the feedback was provided privately (via a report) or publicly (displaying certificates of the customer feedback ratings). We estimated linear regression models on provider performance as measured by sales across different categories to young women from administrative point-of sales data over 12 months and estimated whether performance measures were correlated with shopkeepers' pro-social motivation and concern for social image measured by surveys at Baseline.
resultsYoung women customers completed 9,108 anonymous surveys across 99 shops. Shops receiving non-financial incentives privately did not increase performance. However, shops receiving non-financial incentives publicly reported an increase in sales to young women customers (58%, 95% CI: 20%, 97%), most notably for sexual and reproductive health products (96%, 95% CI: 4%, 187%), specifically oral contraception (154%, 95% CI: 9%, 306%) and pregnancy tests (75%, 95% CI: 8%, 143%). Performance measures were correlated with concern for social image but not pro-social motivation at baseline.
conclusionsPublicly provided non-financial incentives increased performance among drug shopkeepers in Tanzania serving young women. Performance was strongest among those with higher concern for their social image at baseline, rather than those with stronger pro-social motivation. Future interventions using non-financial incentives to motivate healthcare providers should consider leveraging providers' social image concerns to amplify the effectiveness of incentives.
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