Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40896838›Full record

ArticleJMIR medical informatics2025

Resilience in the Face of Disruption: Viewpoint on the CrowdStrike Incident in July 2024.

Christopher R Dennis, Christopher S Evans, Kathleen Duckworth, Misty McLawhorn Skinner, John Hanna, Tanya Thompson, Donette Herring, Richard J Medford

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in JMIR medical informatics, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

8 authors.

Christopher R DennisDepartment of Information Services, ECU Health, 2190 Beasley Drive, Greenville, North Carolina, 27834, United States, 1 252-847-4133, 1 252-847-5561.ORCID 0009-0000-8923-2307
Christopher S EvansDepartment of Information Services, ECU Health, 2190 Beasley Drive, Greenville, North Carolina, 27834, United States, 1 252-847-4133, 1 252-847-5561.ORCID 0000-0003-1499-2867
Kathleen DuckworthDepartment of Information Services, ECU Health, 2190 Beasley Drive, Greenville, North Carolina, 27834, United States, 1 252-847-4133, 1 252-847-5561.ORCID 0009-0000-6250-5600
Misty McLawhorn SkinnerDepartment of Information Services, ECU Health, 2190 Beasley Drive, Greenville, North Carolina, 27834, United States, 1 252-847-4133, 1 252-847-5561.ORCID 0009-0008-5744-1890
John HannaDepartment of Information Services, ECU Health, 2190 Beasley Drive, Greenville, North Carolina, 27834, United States, 1 252-847-4133, 1 252-847-5561.ORCID 0000-0003-0909-9396
Tanya ThompsonDepartment of Information Services, ECU Health, 2190 Beasley Drive, Greenville, North Carolina, 27834, United States, 1 252-847-4133, 1 252-847-5561.ORCID 0009-0002-2857-6629
Donette HerringDepartment of Information Services, ECU Health, 2190 Beasley Drive, Greenville, North Carolina, 27834, United States, 1 252-847-4133, 1 252-847-5561.ORCID 0009-0006-2951-8120
Richard J MedfordDepartment of Information Services, ECU Health, 2190 Beasley Drive, Greenville, North Carolina, 27834, United States, 1 252-847-4133, 1 252-847-5561.ORCID 0000-0001-9814-8043

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Unlabelled: In an era where health care is increasingly dependent on digital infrastructure, the resilience of health IT systems has become a cornerstone of patient safety and operational continuity. As cyber threats grow in frequency and sophistication, health care organizations have turned to advanced cybersecurity tools to safeguard their systems. Yet even the most robust defenses can falter. On July 19, 2024, a routine update from a widely used cybersecurity platform triggered a widespread IT disruption. A flawed sensor configuration led to 8647 "blue screen of death" (BSOD) events, with 729 devices requiring manual remediation. What unfolded was not just a technical crisis but a test of organizational agility, collaboration, and resilience. This viewpoint traces the response to that disruption, highlighting the pivotal role of clinical informaticists and the coordinated efforts that enabled a rapid recovery. From the formation of an incident response team to the triage and mitigation of impacted systems, the response was swift and strategic. Clinical informaticists emerged as key players, bridging the gap between technical teams and frontline care providers. They identified workflow disruptions, facilitated communication, and ensured that patient care remained as uninterrupted as possible. Despite the scale of the outage, operations continued with minimal disruption-thanks to early recognition, decisive action, and cross-disciplinary collaboration. This incident underscored the importance of a well-practiced response plan, clear communication channels, and the integration of clinical expertise in technical recovery efforts. As we reflect on this event, several lessons emerge: the need for continuous refinement of incident response strategies, the value of regular training exercises, and the critical role of clinical informatics in navigating digital crises. This paper calls for a renewed commitment to building resilient health IT ecosystems-ones that can withstand disruption and continue to support the delivery of safe, effective care.

Indexed as

Computer SecurityMedical Informatics ComputingHumansWorkflowclinical informaticscomputer securitycrowdstrike health IT disruptionhealth information systemsincident command systemincident responseIT service managementsystem crash recovery

Identifiers

PMID40896838
PMCPMC12404578

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.