Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40799210›Full record

ArticleNeuroscience of consciousness2025

Deep computational neurophenomenology: a methodological framework for investigating the how of experience.

Lars Sandved-Smith, Juan Diego Bogotá, Jakob Hohwy, Julian Kiverstein, Antoine Lutz

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Neuroscience of consciousness, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 9 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
9citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

9 citing papers in PubMed.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Lars Sandved-SmithMonash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, 29 Ancora Imparo Way, 3168, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2282-1438
Juan Diego BogotáDepartment of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskyla, Seminaarinkatu 15, 40014, Jyväskylä, Finland.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1363-6417
Jakob HohwyMonash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, 29 Ancora Imparo Way, 3168, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3906-3060
Julian KiversteinDepartment of Psychiatry, Amsterdam University Medical Research, Location AMC, Meibergdreef 9, 1105 AZ Amsterdam, Netherlands.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3428-8367
Antoine LutzMonash Centre for Consciousness and Contemplative Studies, Monash University, 29 Ancora Imparo Way, 3168, Melbourne, VIC, Australia.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0258-3233

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The context for our paper comes from the neurophenomenology (NPh) research programme initiated by Francisco Varela at the end of the 1990s. Varela's working hypothesis was that, to be successful, a consciousness research programme must progress by relating first-person phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their third-person counterparts in neuroscience through "mutual constraints". Leveraging Bayesian mechanics, in particular deep parametric active inference, we demonstrate the potential for epistemically advantageous mutual constraints between phenomenological, computational, behavioural, and physiological vocabularies. Specifically, the dual information geometry of Bayesian mechanics serves to establish, under certain conditions, generative passage between lived experience and its physiological instantiation. This paper argues for the epistemological necessity of such a passage and the inclusion of trained reflective awareness in neurophenomenological empirical approaches. In particular, it showcases incremental explanatory gains for the scientist that arise from incorporating the participants' epistemic insights, shifting the focus from the contents of experience (i.e. what a subject experiences in a given experimental set-up) to the how of experience (i.e. the activities of consciousness that allow for a meaningful world to appear to us as such in lived experience). The explanatory power of the resulting 'meta-Bayesian' framework, deep computational NPh, arises from the disciplined circulation between first and third-person perspectives enabled by the formalism of deep parametric active inference, where parametric depth refers to a property of generative models that can form beliefs about the parameters of their own modelling process. Hence, this computational formalism contributes to understanding consciousness by bridging phenomenological descriptions and physiological instantiations, whilst also highlighting the significance of trained first-person investigation in experimental protocols.

Indexed as

active inferenceBayesian mechanicscomputational modellingconsciousnessmethodologyneurophenomenology

Identifiers

PMID40799210
PMCPMC12342169

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.