ArticleInternational journal of health policy and management2025
The Impact Mechanism of Government Regulation on the Operation of Smart Health Senior Care Service Platform: A Perspective From Evolutionary Game Theory.
Article in International journal of health policy and management, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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Abstract
backgroundSmart health and senior care services have developed rapidly to cater to the aging society, but the corresponding regulations are not perfect. The platform and senior care service enterprises have chosen different strategies due to various factors, resulting in disorderly platform development and inefficient resource allocation. This research attempts to establish a regulatory mechanism to promote the active development of the platform.
methodsIn order to mitigate opportunistic behaviors in the smart health senior care service platform, drawing from evolutionary game theory, this study establishes a decision-making model involving the government, the platform, and senior care service enterprises, and scrutinizes the evolutionary behaviors and equilibrium strategies of these three parties.
resultsThere are five equilibrium points among the three parties in the game, and the strategy selection shows periodic changes. The cost and level of positive government regulation, the conversion rate of smart aging construction services provided by the platform, penalties for opportunistic behavior by the platform, as well as the benefits of positive cooperation and penalties for passive cooperation by senior care service enterprises, will significantly affect the strategies of all parties involved.
conclusionThe research results indicate that establishing a regulatory mechanism for the smart health senior care service platform can promote effective cooperation between platform and senior care service enterprises. Active government regulation is the key to the smooth operation of the platform. Through quantitative analysis, the main strategic choices of participants in the smart health senior care service platform can be explained. This model can provide a reference for formulating policies related to smart senior care.
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