ArticleHistory and philosophy of the life sciences2025
The risk of biological race.
Article in History and philosophy of the life sciences, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed.
- Ethical Priorities Among Commercial Genomics Professionals : Survey Evidence Highlighting Diversity, Fragmented Privacy Law, and Human Rights Risks as Central Participant Concerns.Journal of bioethical inquiry · 2026Article
- What is social constructionism about race? A reply to Hochman.Biology & philosophy · 2025Article
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Abstract
Biological race realism (hereafter BRR) is the view that humans form biologically distinct groups. In recent years, Quayshawn Spencer has offered one of the most elaborate versions of that view, but his theory faces several problems (Spencer in Philos Stud 159:181-204, 2012; Spencer in J Philos 111:1-23, 2014; Spencer in 52:46-55, 2015; Spencer in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019a; Hochman in J Philos 110:331-351, 2013; Glasgow et al. in Glasgow, Haslanger, Jeffers, Spencer (eds) What is race? Four philosophical views, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019; Jackson in Philos Theory Pract Biol 14, 2022. https://doi.org/10.3998/ptpbio.2630 ; Winsberg in Biol Philos 37:46, 2022; Msimang in Philos Pap 51:115-145, 2022; Kalewold in Metaphysics of race, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2024; Berenstain forthcoming). In this paper, I raise another problem for Spencer's BRR, arguing that his theory does not fully consider how social, political, and moral values influence the metaphysics of race. Spencer's BRR involves significant epistemic and ethical risks, and these risks indirectly impact Spencer's metaphysical conclusions. I rely on the "science and values" literature to show this and engage with STS and anthropology literature (Douglas in Inductive risk and values in science, 2000. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c ; Douglas in Science, policy, and the value-free ideal, Pittsburgh University Press, Pittsburgh, 2009; Brown in Philos Sci 80:829-839, 2013; Brown in Current controversies in values and science, Routledge, Milton Park, 2017; Biddle and Kukla Explor Induc Risk Case Stud Values Sci 1:215-238, 2017; Elliot and Richards in Exploring inductive risk: case studies of values in science, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017). This analysis raises broader questions about the relationship between values, social responsibility, and metaphysics. Previous criticisms of Spencer's BRR have barely touched on those questions. Hence, by critically discussing problems with Spencer's already troubled view, my main goal is to open the debate for such important questions.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.