Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40724471›Full record

ArticleEntropy (Basel, Switzerland)2025

Nash Equilibria in Four-Strategy Quantum Extensions of the Prisoner's Dilemma Game.

Piotr Frąckiewicz, Anna Gorczyca-Goraj, Krzysztof Grzanka, Katarzyna Nowakowska, Marek Szopa

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Entropy (Basel, Switzerland), 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Quantum Negotiation Games: Toward Ethical Equilibria.Entropy (Basel, Switzerland) · 2025
    Article
  2. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Piotr FrąckiewiczInstitute of Exact and Technical Sciences, Pomeranian University in Słupsk, ul. Bohaterów Westerplatte 64, 76-200 Słupsk, Poland.
Anna Gorczyca-GorajDepartment of Operations Research, University of Economics in Katowice, ul. Bogucicka 3, 40-287 Katowice, Poland.ORCID 0000-0001-8222-0987
Krzysztof GrzankaDepartment of Operations Research, University of Economics in Katowice, ul. Bogucicka 3, 40-287 Katowice, Poland.ORCID 0000-0001-7228-4768
Katarzyna NowakowskaInstitute of Exact and Technical Sciences, Pomeranian University in Słupsk, ul. Bohaterów Westerplatte 64, 76-200 Słupsk, Poland.ORCID 0000-0002-2837-8481
Marek SzopaDepartment of Operations Research, University of Economics in Katowice, ul. Bogucicka 3, 40-287 Katowice, Poland.ORCID 0000-0001-7897-7004

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The concept of Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum extensions of the general form of the Prisoner's Dilemma game is investigated. The process of quantization involves incorporating two additional unitary strategies, which effectively expand the classical game. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. The resulting Nash equilibria are found to be more closely aligned with Pareto-optimal solutions than those of the conventional Nash equilibrium outcome of the classical game. Our results demonstrate the complexity and diversity of strategic behavior in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In particular, we provide a detailed characterization of strategy profiles and their corresponding Nash equilibria, thereby extending the understanding of quantum strategies' impact on traditional game-theoretical problems.

Indexed as

Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein schemegame isomorphismNash equilibriumPrisoner’s Dilemmaquantum extended games

Identifiers

PMID40724471
PMCPMC12294518

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.