ArticleJournal of public economics2025
Provider payment incentives: Evidence from the U.S. hospice industry.
Article in Journal of public economics, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed.
- Trends and factors associated with hospice care utilization and place of death in the United States between 2002 and 2020: a retrospective data analysis based on the health and retirement study.BMC palliative care · 2026Article
- Market segmentation by profit status: evidence from hospice.Health affairs scholar · 2024Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
Abstract
Combining capitation with a cap on health care providers' average revenue can reduce allocative inefficiency. But the cap may be undercut by health care providers who churn their patient censuses. We investigate this possibility in the U.S. hospice industry, where Medicare pays hospice programs fixed daily rates but caps their average annual revenue. By leveraging variation generated by the cap's nonlinear design and the transition between fiscal years, we find that programs on track to exceed the cap raise enrollment rates by 5.8 % and live discharge rates by 4.3 % in the fourth quarter. But this churning falls far short of eliminating their financial penalties: it amounts to 10 % of an average program's excess revenue at most. Marginal enrollees have longer remaining lifetimes and more fragmented hospice spells on average, suggesting weaker intrinsic demand for hospice care. We discuss the cap's implications for market structure.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.