ArticleCerebellum (London, England)2025
False Beliefs, True Deficits: Investigating Social Cognition in Friedreich Ataxia.
Article in Cerebellum (London, England), 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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5 authors.
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Abstract
Friedreich ataxia (FA) is a cerebellar neurodegenerative disease primarily known for its motor symptoms, but emerging evidence suggests it also affects higher-order cognitive functions, including Theory of Mind (ToM). This study aimed to assess ToM in individuals with FA using a Picture Sequencing Task (PST) that distinguishes between mechanical, social script, true belief, and false belief scenarios, with a focus on the latter as key marker of mentalizing in cerebellar diseases. Twenty-three FA patients and age- and sex-matched healthy controls completed the PST. Accuracy and normalized reaction times were compared between groups. Correlations between task performance and clinical severity (SARA score) were analyzed within the FA group. P values were adjusted for false discovery rates (p-FDR) using the Benjamini Hochberg method. FA patients showed significantly lower accuracy in the false belief condition (p-FDR = 0.03) and a reduced global accuracy score (p-FDR = 0.03), while other conditions showed no group differences. Accuracy in false belief trials negatively correlated with disease severity (ρ = − 0.482, p-FDR = 0.04). Normalized reaction times did not differ between groups, suggesting preserved processing speed when accounting for motor slowness. Our results reveal a selective impairment in false belief reasoning in FA, consistent with ToM deficits observed in other cerebellar and neurodevelopmental disorders. Not applicable.
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