Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40630110›Full record

ArticleOne health (Amsterdam, Netherlands)2025

Retrospective case study of the impacts of multiple One Health oriented biocontainment research facilities during the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic.

Renata S M Landers, Paul D Hodgson, Michael Puckette, Sankar P Chaki, William Wilson, Stephen Higgs, Kurt A Zuelke

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in One health (Amsterdam, Netherlands), 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

7 authors.

Renata S M LandersGlobal Health Research Complex (GHRC), Division of Research, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, United States of America.
Paul D HodgsonVaccine and Infectious Disease Organization (VIDO), University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada.
Michael PucketteNational Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), Agricultural Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Manhattan, KS, United States of America.
Sankar P ChakiGlobal Health Research Complex (GHRC), Division of Research, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, United States of America.
William WilsonNational Bio and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), Agricultural Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, Manhattan, KS, United States of America.
Stephen HiggsBiosecurity Research Institute (BRI), Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS, United States of America.
Kurt A ZuelkeGlobal Health Research Complex (GHRC), Division of Research, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, United States of America.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic revealed the importance of rapidly identifying and controlling zoonotic diseases and underscored the necessity of coordinating and planning pandemic preparedness with comprehensive one health strategies to prevent and control the emergence and transmission of zoonotic pathogens. The present case study catalogued the scope and range of activities performed by the biocontainment research facilities that ultimately comprised the Research Alliance for Veterinary Science and BSL-3 Biodefense Network (RAV3N) created during SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Results revealed that nearly all RAV3N members directly contributed to all aspects of the response against the pandemic, from human diagnostic testing to specialized animal disease models for developing medical countermeasures to investigating the potential for pets and wildlife to serve as potential reservoirs for the SARS-CoV-2. Reflecting their expertise, approximately 80 % of members developed multiple animal models as part of their SARS-CoV-2 research. RAV3N members investigated basic virology, transmission, and host susceptibility in animal models ranging from non-human primates and livestock, to wildlife, arthropods, and mice. Approximately half of member institutions provided SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic testing services and/or environmental wastewater testing and surveillance to augment limited public health laboratory capacity during the pandemic. State and Federal sources funded and authorized all the reported response activities, however only 40 % of these response activities were coordinated with local public health officials. A major recommendation is to improve direct communication and pandemic response planning between the veterinary science and zoonotic disease and human public health communities. RAV3N provides a model for sharing information and coordinating response activities between veterinary science and public health officials in future disease outbreaks.

Indexed as

COVID-19One HealthPandemic responseRAV3N network

Identifiers

PMID40630110
PMCPMC12235735

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.