ArticlePloS one2025
Should manufacturers choose technological innovation in dual-channel supply chains during emergencies?
Article in PloS one, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
1 citing paper in PubMed.
- Analysis of nationwide availability of negotiated drugs in China's National Reimbursement Drug List.Frontiers in public health · 2025Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
This study investigates pricing and coordination strategies for a dual-channel supply chain (DCSC), considering technological innovations in emergencies. We have established the DCSC model consisting of a manufacturer, a retailer, and an E-commerce platform (ECP). Whether manufacturers choose to invest in technological innovation during emergencies can be divided into traditional production mode and technological innovation mode. Using the reverse induction method to solve the Stackelberg game problem, explore the pricing and channel selection strategies of each member in a DCSC under different modes. In addition, a revenue-sharing contract for a DCSC under emergencies was designed and improved. Research has shown that under emergencies, consumers' technological innovation preference can increase the profits of each member in the DCSC and manufacturers' technological innovation level. Manufacturers are more willing to choose technological innovation mode rather than traditional production mode. However, an increase in the commission rate of ECP can hinder the level of technological innovation of manufacturers and affect the issue of choosing between offline channel and ECP channel. Specifically, when the commission rate exceeds a certain threshold, the offline channel should be chosen. Finally, traditional revenue-sharing contracts fail to effectively coordinate DCSC that incorporate technological innovation during emergencies. To address this limitation, an improved revenue-sharing contract is proposed, which enhances the level of technological innovation while achieving Pareto improvements within the DCSC.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.