Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40594249›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2025

Fuzzy cooperative game analysis within the international railway freight coalition framework.

Jiao Wu, Shansong Wu

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

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0citing papers in PubMed
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1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

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2 · The registry

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3 · Its place in the literature

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No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

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5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Jiao WuSchool of Management Science and Engineering, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian, China.
Shansong WuSchool of Accounting, Wuxi Taihu University, Wuxi, China. wushansong2019@outlook.com.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

International railway freight cooperation is essential for enhancing regional logistics efficiency, especially in the context of rising anti-globalization trends and pandemic-induced disruptions to maritime transport. This study aims to develop a stable and equitable allocation mechanism for freight volume and operating revenue (freight revenue collected by a country's rail system or designated freight operators) under the international rail freight coalition framework. We construct a fuzzy cooperative game model that accounts for export demand, participation levels, transport resource utilization, and return empty load rates. Results from the CSERE case show that the proposed scheme increases total operating revenue by 37.85-204.88% for member countries compared to traditional mileage-based allocations, and reduces the return empty load rate from 40 to 7.83%. The fuzzy coalition model ensures fair compensation for disadvantaged countries and enhances the overall stability of cooperation. These findings offer practical insights for policymakers and rail freight operators aiming to promote efficient multilateral trade logistics. The originality of this work lies in integrating fuzzy coalition game theory with real-world data to address strategic behavior and empty return issues in international rail freight.

Indexed as

Cooperative gameEconomic endowmentFuzzy coalitionRail freight volume allocationRegional multilateral trade

Identifiers

PMID40594249
PMCPMC12217861

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.