Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40567987›Full record

ArticleFrontiers in public health2025

China's coordinated tripartite medical reform: strategic balancing of interests among pharmaceuticals, healthcare, and health insurance.

Hanxiang Gong, Wenbo Wu, Jifeng Li, Baoling Wu, Mengqi Gao, Yajun Yang

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Frontiers in public health, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 8 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
8citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

8 citing papers in PubMed.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

6 authors.

Hanxiang Gong *The Second Affiliated Hospital, Guangzhou Medical University, Guangzhou City, Guangdong, China.
Wenbo Wu *The Second Affiliated Hospital, Guangzhou Medical University, Guangzhou City, Guangdong, China.
Jifeng LiThe Second Affiliated Hospital, Guangzhou Medical University, Guangzhou City, Guangdong, China.
Baoling WuThe Second Affiliated Hospital, Guangzhou Medical University, Guangzhou City, Guangdong, China.
Mengqi GaoThe Second Affiliated Hospital, Guangzhou Medical University, Guangzhou City, Guangdong, China.
Yajun YangThe Second Affiliated Hospital, Guangzhou Medical University, Guangzhou City, Guangdong, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

China has implemented the "Triple-Medical" reform, aiming to enhance the overall efficacy of the public healthcare system through deep integration and coordination among healthcare, pharmaceuticals, and health insurance regulator. This study utilizes game theory to analyze the strategic interplay and conflicts of interest among these three sectors within China's reform context, exploring the strategic choices and interactions that occur during the reform process. This study utilizes game theory to analyze the strategic interplay among pharmaceutical companies, healthcare institutions, and the health insurance regulator in China's healthcare reform. The model examines key variables and behaviors of each stakeholder, with MATLAB simulations analyzing evolutionarily stable strategies and parameter sensitivity. The findings reveal complex dynamic interactions among the strategies adopted by the various stakeholders within the healthcare reform, with the optimal strategies converging at the equilibrium point. Specifically, pharmaceutical companies seek maximum economic gains through drug pricing and quality control; healthcare institutions strive to enhance service efficiency and quality to meet patient needs; and medical insurance regulatory bodies play a crucial role in ensuring the efficiency and fairness of fund utilization. Such strategic alignments contribute to the stable operation of the healthcare system and maximize the interests of all parties involved. The study concludes that coordinated strategies among pharmaceutical companies, healthcare institutions, and health insurance regulator can achieve equilibrium and enhance the efficiency and equity of China's healthcare system. Changes in penalties for pharmaceutical companies, costs of medical service quality, and medical insurance regulatory costs critically influence healthcare reform, providing empirical support and a theoretical basis for effective policy-making. Refining policy adjustments and strategic optimizations can effectively coordinate the interests of all parties, propelling China's healthcare system toward greater efficiency and fairness.

Indexed as

Delivery of Health CareDrug IndustryHealth Care ReformInsurance, HealthChinaConflict of InterestGame TheoryHumansevolutionary game theoryhealthcare reformmedical insurance regulationpharmaceutical policystakeholder coordination

Identifiers

PMID40567987
PMCPMC12187667

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.