Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40562441›Full record

SynthesisBMJ (Clinical research ed.)2025

Effect of UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance programme on quality of primary care: systematic review with quantitative synthesis.

Leonard Ho, Stewart W Mercer, David Henderson, Eddie Donaghy, Bruce Guthrie

Abstract readSystematic Review
In one paragraph

Synthesis in BMJ (Clinical research ed.), 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 7 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
7citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

7 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Observational
  3. Article
  4. Financial incentives and information provision for post-pandemic primary care quality recovery: a longitudinal study in Catalonia.The British journal of general practice : the journal of the Royal College of General Practitioners · 2026
    Article
  5. Article
  6. Observational
  7. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Leonard HoNIHR Health Determinants Research Collaboration Aberdeen, Aberdeen, UK.ORCID 0000-0001-8353-9631
Stewart W MercerAdvanced Care Research Centre, Usher Institute, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-1703-3664
David HendersonCentre for Population Health Sciences, Usher Institute, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-4411-8532
Eddie DonaghyCentre for Population Health Sciences, Usher Institute, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK.ORCID 0000-0002-7383-0107
Bruce GuthrieAdvanced Care Research Centre, Usher Institute, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK.ORCID 0000-0003-4191-4880

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveTo systematically review the one and three year impact on quality of care of the introduction and withdrawal of financial incentives in the UK Quality and Outcomes Framework pay-for-performance programme.

designSystematic review with quantitative synthesis. DATA SOURCES: MEDLINE, Embase, CINAHL, PsycINFO, and Scopus databases were searched from 1 January 2004 to 3 September 2024. STUDY SELECTION: Eligible studies used repeated cross sectional or cohort designs with consistent measurement before and after incentive introduction or withdrawal. Studies with a minimum of three time points before and after intervention were included in quantitative synthesis. DATA EXTRACTION: Analysis used both reported impact if available and de novo interrupted time series analysis of extracted raw data if not reported by the original study. DATA SYNTHESIS: Meta-analysis was not appropriate; findings were quantitatively synthesised by reporting medians and interquartile ranges of changes in quality or reported narratively. Risk of bias was assessed using the Mixed Methods Assessment Tool.

results30 studies were included, with 11 providing data for quantitative synthesis. Across all indicators, evidence was found of improvement in recorded quality at one year after incentive introduction (83 indicators; median change compared with that predicted by pre-incentivisation trends 6.1 (interquartile range (IQR) 1.9 to 14.6) percentage points) but less consistently at three years (72 indicators; median change 0.7 (-2.1 to 8.9) percentage points). Impact was higher for process indicators with lower performance in the year before incentivisation. Incentive withdrawal was associated with reduction in recorded quality compared with predicted at both one year (31 indicators; median change -10.7 (IQR -17.9 to -3.8) percentage points) and three years (31 indicators; median change -12.8 (-21.0 to -4.4) percentage points). The largest changes with both incentive introduction and withdrawal were for complex process indicators such as diabetes foot screening, with smaller changes in simple processes such as blood pressure measurement, intermediate outcomes, and treatment indicators. For all types of indicators, the reduction in quality following incentive withdrawal generally matched or exceeded the gains observed after incentive introduction (for example, for 14 indicators with data for both, median change at three years for incentive introduction was a 1.4 (IQR -0.9 to 4.6) percentage point increase versus a 3.9 (IQR 2.2 to 11.6) decrease for incentive withdrawal).

conclusionQuality and Outcomes Framework incentives consistently improved quality of care at one year beyond that predicted by pre-incentivisation trends, but by three years the impact was inconsistent and not clearly better than trend. Gains from incentivisation seemed to reverse after incentive withdrawal. STUDY REGISTRATION: Prospero CRD42023467627.

Indexed as

Primary Health CareQuality of Health CareReimbursement, IncentiveHumansQuality ImprovementQuality Indicators, Health CareUnited Kingdom

Identifiers

PMID40562441
PMCPMC12188983

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.