Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40509829›Full record

ArticleBeijing da xue xue bao. Yi xue ban = Journal of Peking University. Health sciences2025

[Three-party game and simulation analysis of health-related information quality regulation in public health emergencies].

Y Wang, R Yuan, S Li, C Chang

Abstract readEnglish Abstract
In one paragraph

Article in Beijing da xue xue bao. Yi xue ban = Journal of Peking University. Health sciences, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Y WangDepartment of Social Medicine and Health Education, School of Public Health, Peking University, Beijing 100191, China.
R YuanDepartment of Social Medicine and Health Education, School of Public Health, Peking University, Beijing 100191, China.
S LiDepartment of Social Medicine and Health Education, School of Public Health, Peking University, Beijing 100191, China.
C ChangDepartment of Social Medicine and Health Education, School of Public Health, Peking University, Beijing 100191, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

objectiveTo construct a tripartite game model involving the government, the public, and the pharmaceutical industry alliance during public health emergencies, revealing the dynamic mechanisms of health-related information quality regulation and exploring effective strategies to optimize the information dissemination environment through reward-punishment mechanisms.

methodsBased on evolutionary game theory, a tripartite evolutionary game model was established, integrating strategy spaces, payoff functions, and parameter definitions for each stakeholder. The pharmaceutical industry alliance ' s strategies included publishing high- or low-quality information (

resultsThe study revealed three key findings: (1) Public rational discernment (

conclusionA "carrot-stick" collaborative governance framework is proposed, emphasizing categorized regulation, AI-enabled auditing, and dynamic penalty systems. Future research should integrate emotional utility functions to address irrational decision-making impacts, thereby enhancing the adaptability of health information regulatory systems.

Indexed as

EmergenciesGame TheoryInformation DisseminationPublic HealthComputer SimulationDrug IndustryHumansHealth-related informationQuality supervisionThree-party evolution game

Identifiers

PMID40509829
PMCPMC12171585

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.