Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40503533›Full record

ArticleHealth affairs scholar2025

Merit-Based Incentive Payment System: longitudinal performance and uneven rewards for safety-net providers over 5 years.

Meng-Yun Lin, Zhang Zhang, Kathleen Carey, Risha Gidwani, Amresh D Hanchate

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health affairs scholar, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Meng-Yun LinDepartment of Social Sciences and Health Policy, Wake Forest University School of Medicine, Winston-Salem, NC 27101, United States.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8507-031X
Zhang ZhangDepartment of Health Policy and Management, Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health, Baltimore, MD 21205, United States.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9344-6578
Kathleen CareyDepartment of Health Law, Policy & Management, Boston University School of Public Health, Boston, MA 02118, United States.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7924-431X
Risha GidwaniDivision of Health Care Policy and Research, University of Colorado School of Medicine, Aurora, CO 80045, United States.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3548-2332
Amresh D HanchateDepartment of Social Sciences and Health Policy, Wake Forest University School of Medicine, Winston-Salem, NC 27101, United States.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7038-4463

Funding

Intended and Unintended Consequences of the Merit-Based Incentive Payments System Program: Early EvidenceR21AG072242 · NIA · WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES · PI LIN, MENG-YUN · 2022 to 2023
$383k
NIA NIH HHS R21 AG072242
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Introduction: Medicare Merit-based Incentive Payment System (MIPS), established by Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services to transition Medicare reimbursement toward value-based care, has faced criticism for its administrative complexity and potential inequities affecting safety-net providers (SNPs). Methods: This study analyzed 5-year data (2018-2022) to evaluate the performance and financial outcomes of clinicians consistently participating in MIPS, focusing on disparities between SNPs and non-SNPs. Results: We found that safety-net specialists were 31% more likely than non-safety-net specialists to consistently receive positive payment adjustments and earned modestly higher average adjustment rates (0.35% points). However, despite this superior performance, safety-net specialists did not achieve greater cumulative financial rewards due to MIPS's percentage-based adjustment structure, which disadvantages clinicians with smaller billing volumes. Our analysis also showed that MIPS financial incentives were generally modest-ranging from $300 to $4000 over 5 years-far below the estimated $12 000 in annual administrative compliance costs per physician reported in prior research. Conclusion: To address these disparities and inefficiencies, policymakers should consider alternative models such as the American Medical Association's proposed Data-Driven Performance Payment System, which reduces administrative burden by simplifying the reporting process and ensures fairer financial rewards by uncoupling incentive payments from billing volume-thereby improving equity for safety-net clinicians.

Indexed as

alternative payment modelshealth equityMedicaresafety-net providersvalue-based payments

Identifiers

PMID40503533
PMCPMC12152720

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.