Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40474928›Full record

ArticleOpen mind : discoveries in cognitive science2025

A Rational Framework for Group-Based Selective Social Learning.

Max Taylor-Davies, Neil Bramley, Christopher G Lucas

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Open mind : discoveries in cognitive science, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Max Taylor-DaviesSchool of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK.
Neil BramleySchool of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4141-8476
Christopher G LucasSchool of Informatics, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Social learning can be a powerful tool, allowing us to acquire knowledge and adaptive behaviours while bypassing many of the costs of learning through direct experience. However, not everyone's behaviour is equally valuable to learn from, as other people's goals or preferences may differ dramatically from our own. In this paper, we consider the problem of selectively learning from others on the basis of direct and indirect inferences about their task-relevant preferences. Specifically, we focus on the setting where a social learner must generalise preference judgements across individuals using shared features and other cues, and so develop a formal account that can reconcile a seemingly disparate empirical picture of group-based selective social learning. Across three behavioural experiments, we demonstrate that people are sensitive to the contextual significance of group identity cues when choosing who to learn from in partially observed environments. We show that this behaviour cannot be accounted for by a range of simpler heuristic strategies.

Indexed as

Bayesian modelspreference inferencerational analysissocial learningsocial learning strategiestheory of mind

Identifiers

PMID40474928
PMCPMC12140574

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.