ArticleHealth care management science2025
Optimal quality oversight in kidney transplantation and its impact on transplant centers' waitlist management.
Article in Health care management science, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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4 authors.
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Abstract
This paper studies the effects of quality oversight in the context of assessing kidney transplantation-related outcomes and possible unintended consequences (e.g., cherry-picking of organs and selection of healthier transplant candidates). In this context, we propose a stochastic economic model that identifies socially optimal kidney transplant choices given the inherent trade-off between the expected wait time and the quality of the received donor kidney for a given patient. Socially optimal decisions seek to maximize the utilitarian welfare function defined as the sum of all patients' post-transplant expected utilities. To determine the social loss, we compare the socially optimal decisions to those taken by a transplant program that maximizes its utility. We derive the optimal quality oversight policy that minimizes social loss and examine how decisions are impacted due to the changes introduced by the new Kidney Allocation System. Our empirical analysis using data from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients and United States Renal Data System indicates that current quality oversight imposed through Conditions of Participation results in inefficient transplant decisions for 56% of recipients, and the performance is inconsistent across different regions and parameters. We propose that the risk-adjusted post-transplant performance assessment policy considers the factors impacting demand-supply parameters such as organ availability in the 11 US transplant regions, candidates' blood type, and the newly introduced Kidney Allocation System. Policymakers and providers can utilize insights from our findings to design effective oversight mechanisms and make informed decisions regarding transplant and waitlist management that yield desired outcomes.
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