Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40309187›Full record

ArticleRoyal Society open science2025

Game changing mutation.

Omer Edhan, Ziv Hellman

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Royal Society open science, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

Omer EdhanDepartment of Economics, University of Manchester, Manchester, UK.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4441-3304
Ziv HellmanDepartment of Economics, Bar-Ilan University Department of Economics, Ramat Gan, Israel.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

We present a model of the effect of mutation on haploid sexually reproducing populations by modelling the reproductive dynamics as occurring in the context of a common interests game played by the loci, with the alleles in the role of pure actions. Absent mutations, the population will deterministically converge to a pure Nash equilibrium of the game. A novel mutation adds new alleles, hence is tantamount to a change of the game by the addition of new actions. If the new game defined by the mutation removes the former pure Nash equilibrium the game changing mutation becomes in addition a Nash equilibrium changing mutation, as the population will then move to a new equilibrium with an increase in fitness. A graph of common interests games is defined, and evolution by mutation is modelled as a path through this graph. We discuss two applications-fitness valley crossing and evolutionary contingency.

Indexed as

game theorygradientmutationpotential games

Identifiers

PMID40309187
PMCPMC12041896

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.