ArticleScientific reports2025
Reevaluating the beautiful is moral stereotype by examining the impact of personal liking and belief in a just world.
Article in Scientific reports, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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Abstract
According to the "beautiful is moral" stereotype, people perceive attractive individuals as more moral than unattractive ones. To refine this stereotype, we examined liking as a mediator and belief in a just world (BJW) as a moderator of this effect. Study 1 (N = 788; US sample) and Study 2 (N = 1913; Polish sample) confirmed that highly attractive individuals were perceived as more moral than moderately attractive ones, but only for female targets. As predicted, liking mediated the relationship between attractiveness and moral character judgments, supporting an affect-based explanation of this stereotype. In Study 3 (N = 1024; British sample), we independently manipulated the target's attractiveness and liking and found that high attractiveness alone was no longer associated with greater morality. However, confirming the role of attitudinal influences, the liked target was judged as more moral than the disliked one. Across all three studies, BJW did not moderate the relationship between attractiveness and moral judgments, suggesting that the effect of attractiveness on morality operates primarily through affective mechanisms rather than belief in fairness or justice. These findings indicate that liking exerts a stronger influence on perceived morality than attractiveness, challenging traditional conceptions of the "beautiful is moral" stereotype.
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