Evidence map›Paper›PMID 40153465›Full record

ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2025

Meltdown of trust in weakly governed economies.

Stephen Polasky, Marten Scheffer, John M Anderies

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Anti-science and the science community.Nature reviews. Microbiology · 2025
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Stephen Polasky *Department of Applied Economics, University of Minnesota, St. Paul, MN 55108.ORCID 0000-0003-4934-2434
Marten Scheffer *Aquatic Ecology and Water Quality Management, Wageningen University, Wageningen NL-6700 AA, The Netherlands.ORCID 0000-0002-2100-0312
John M Anderies *School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287.ORCID 0000-0002-0138-8655

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

A well-functioning society requires well-functioning institutions that ensure prosperity, fair distribution of wealth, social participation, security, and informative media. Such institutions are built on a foundation of trust. However, while trust is essential for economic success and good governance, interconnected mechanisms inherent in weakly governed market economies tend to undermine the very trust on which such success depends. These mechanisms include the intrinsic tendency for inequality to grow, media to boost perceived unfairness, and self-interest to gain rewards at the expense of others. These mechanisms, if left unchecked, allow wealth concentration to result in state capture where institutions facilitate further wealth concentration instead of the promoting the common good. As a result, people may become alienated and untrusting of fellow citizens and of institutions. Several democracies now experience such dynamics, the United States being a prime example. We discuss ways in which well-functioning democracies can design institutions to help avoid this social trap, and the much harder challenge of escaping the trap once in it. Successful cases such as the ability of Scandinavian democracies to maintain high-trust, and the US progressive era in the early 20th century provide instructive examples.

Indexed as

democracydisinformationgovernanceinequalitytrust

Identifiers

PMID40153465
PMCPMC12002020

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.