ArticleScientific reports2025
Subjective probability is modulated by emotions.
Article in Scientific reports, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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3 authors.
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Abstract
Information about risks and probabilities is ubiquitous in our environment, forming the basis for decisions in an uncertain world. Emotions are known to modulate subjective probability when probabilistic information is desired (as in gambles) or undesired (as in risks). Yet little is known about the role of emotions in shaping the subjective probability of affectively neutral events. We investigated this in one correlational study (Study 1, N = 162) and one experimental study (Study 2, N = 119). As predicted, we found that participants higher in emotional dominance were more conservative in their probability estimates, avoiding the extremes. Remarkably, this pattern also transferred to realistic risk assessments. Furthermore, respondents' tendency to use the representativeness heuristic as a proxy for probability was increased in high dominance individuals. Our findings suggest that emotional dominance may be a unifying construct explaining previously reported effects of emotions on probabilistic cognition.
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