ArticlePloS one2025
Gains vs losses in pay-for-performance: Stated preference evidence from a U.S. survey.
Article in PloS one, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
1 citing paper in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.
- Performance-based payment models and value-based health care: a semi-systematic review through theoretical lenses.Frontiers in health services · 2026Pooled it
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
5 authors.
Funding
Abstract
backgroundPay-for-performance (P4P) incentives can be paid as a bonus (gain) or a penalty (loss). Diminishing marginal utility of wealth suggests that, starting from the same initial wealth, individuals dislike losses more than they like equivalent gains.
objectiveThis study reports the minimum financial gain or loss required to motivate primary care providers and clinical staff to try to increase their human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination rates. DATA: In 2022, we conducted a national U.S. survey through WebMD's Medscape Network of clinical staff working in primary care clinics that provided HPV vaccination to children ages 9 through 12 years (N = 2,527; response rate = 57%).
methodsWe randomized respondents to one of two hypothetical HPV vaccine incentive designs: a bonus for reaching an unspecified target HPV vaccination rate and a penalty for failing to reach the unspecified target. The primary outcome is the self-reported smallest incentive amount (U.S. dollars) that would motivate participants to try and increase their HPV vaccination rates. We tested for differences across P4P designs using unadjusted responses and linear regressions adjusting for clinic and respondent characteristics. We also tested for heterogeneous responses by experience with incentizves, training, and rurality.
resultsThe mean amount required to motivate effort was $2,155 in the gain P4P design and $1,185 in the loss P4P design (unadjusted difference = $970 [p < 0.001], adjusted difference = $967 [p < 0.001]). There were no heterogeneous effects by rurality or experience with incentives. Physicians reported the highest differences (in dollars) between gain and loss P4P designs.
conclusionsStated preference data from primary care clinical staff suggests that effective P4P incentives could be half as large if designed as losses rather than gains.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.