Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39928672›Full record

ArticlePloS one2025

Gains vs losses in pay-for-performance: Stated preference evidence from a U.S. survey.

Justin G Trogdon, Aveena Khanderia, Kathryn Brignole, Jodi A Lewis, Tara Licciardello Queen

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PloS one, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Justin G TrogdonDepartment of Health Policy and Management, Gillings School of Global Public Health, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, United States of America.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5484-7870
Aveena KhanderiaDepartment of Health Policy and Management, Gillings School of Global Public Health, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, United States of America.ORCID https://orcid.org/0009-0009-3159-8950
Kathryn BrignoleLineberger Comprehensive Cancer Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, United States of America.
Jodi A LewisDepartment of Health Policy and Management, Gillings School of Global Public Health, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, United States of America.ORCID https://orcid.org/0009-0007-6722-0904
Tara Licciardello QueenDepartment of Health Behavior, Gillings School of Public Health, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, United States of America.

Funding

Program Project – Improving Provider Announcement Communication Training (IMPACT)P01CA250989 · NCI · UNIV OF NORTH CAROLINA CHAPEL HILL · PI QUEEN, TARA L · 2021 to 2025
$11.7M
NCI NIH HHS P01 CA250989
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

backgroundPay-for-performance (P4P) incentives can be paid as a bonus (gain) or a penalty (loss). Diminishing marginal utility of wealth suggests that, starting from the same initial wealth, individuals dislike losses more than they like equivalent gains.

objectiveThis study reports the minimum financial gain or loss required to motivate primary care providers and clinical staff to try to increase their human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccination rates. DATA: In 2022, we conducted a national U.S. survey through WebMD's Medscape Network of clinical staff working in primary care clinics that provided HPV vaccination to children ages 9 through 12 years (N = 2,527; response rate = 57%).

methodsWe randomized respondents to one of two hypothetical HPV vaccine incentive designs: a bonus for reaching an unspecified target HPV vaccination rate and a penalty for failing to reach the unspecified target. The primary outcome is the self-reported smallest incentive amount (U.S. dollars) that would motivate participants to try and increase their HPV vaccination rates. We tested for differences across P4P designs using unadjusted responses and linear regressions adjusting for clinic and respondent characteristics. We also tested for heterogeneous responses by experience with incentizves, training, and rurality.

resultsThe mean amount required to motivate effort was $2,155 in the gain P4P design and $1,185 in the loss P4P design (unadjusted difference =  $970 [p < 0.001], adjusted difference =  $967 [p < 0.001]). There were no heterogeneous effects by rurality or experience with incentives. Physicians reported the highest differences (in dollars) between gain and loss P4P designs.

conclusionsStated preference data from primary care clinical staff suggests that effective P4P incentives could be half as large if designed as losses rather than gains.

Indexed as

Papillomavirus InfectionsPapillomavirus VaccinesReimbursement, IncentiveVaccinationAdultChildFemaleHumansMaleMiddle AgedMotivationPrimary Health CareSurveys and QuestionnairesUnited StatesPapillomavirus Vaccines

Identifiers

PMID39928672
PMCPMC11809869

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.