Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39896024›Full record

ArticlePeerJ. Computer science2025

Secure software development: leveraging application call graphs to detect security vulnerabilities.

Lei Yan, Guanghuai Zhao, Xiaohui Li, Pengxuan Sun

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in PeerJ. Computer science, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
0citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

0 citing papers in PubMed.

No citing paper in PubMed yet.

4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Lei YanState Grid Beijing Electric Power Company, Beijing, China.
Guanghuai ZhaoState Grid Beijing Electric Power Company, Beijing, China.
Xiaohui LiState Grid Beijing Electric Power Company, Beijing, China.
Pengxuan SunThe Faculty of Information Technology, Beijing University of Technology, Beijing, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The inconsistency in software development standards frequently leads to vulnerabilities that can jeopardize an application's cryptographic integrity. This situation can result in incomplete or flawed encryption processes. Vulnerabilities may manifest as missing, bypassed, or improperly executed encryption functions or the absence of critical cryptographic mechanisms, which eventually weaken security goals. This article introduces a thorough method for detecting vulnerabilities using dynamic and static analysis, focusing on a cryptographic function dominance tree. This strategy systematically minimizes the likelihood of integrity breaches in cryptographic applications. A layered and modular model is developed to maintain integrity by mapping the entire flow of cryptographic function calls across various components. The cryptographic function call graph and dominance tree are extracted and subsequently analyzed using an integrated dynamic and static technique. The extracted information undergoes strict evaluation against the anticipated function call sequence in the relevant cryptographic module to identify and localize potential security issues. Experimental findings demonstrate that the proposed method considerably enhances the accuracy and comprehensiveness of vulnerability detection in cryptographic applications, improving implementation security and resilience against misuse vulnerabilities.

Indexed as

AuthenticationData protectionIntrusion detectionNetwork securitySecure software developmentSecurity vulnerabilities

Identifiers

PMID39896024
PMCPMC11784778

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.