Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39895950›Full record

ArticleBehavioral ecology : official journal of the International Society for Behavioral Ecology

Territorial-sneaker games with non-uniform interactions and female mate choice.

Thomas N Sherratt, Christopher D Beatty, Ian Dewan, Katherine Di Iorio, Isaac Finkelstein, Karl Loeffler-Henry, Marrissa Miller, Falisha Para, Megan Raposo, Frances Sherratt

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Behavioral ecology : official journal of the International Society for Behavioral Ecology. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

10 authors.

Thomas N SherrattDepartment of Biology, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, Canada, K1S 5B6.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6837-3848
Christopher D BeattyProgram for Conservation Genomics, Department of Biology. Stanford University, Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305, United States.
Ian DewanDepartment of Theoretical Biology, Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology, August-Thienemann-Str. 2, 24306 Plön, Germany.
Katherine Di IorioDepartment of Biology, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, Canada, K1S 5B6.
Isaac FinkelsteinDepartment of Biology, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, Canada, K1S 5B6.
Karl Loeffler-HenryDepartment of Biology, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, Canada, K1S 5B6.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3766-9352
Marrissa MillerDepartment of Biology, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, Canada, K1S 5B6.
Falisha ParaDepartment of Biology, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, Canada, K1S 5B6.
Megan RaposoDepartment of Biology, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, Canada, K1S 5B6.
Frances SherrattDepartment of Neuroscience, Carleton University, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, ON, Canada, K1S 5B6.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Male territorial-sneaker polymorphisms are common in nature. To understand how these polymorphisms evolve, we developed a game theoretical model analogous to the classical Hawk-Dove model, but with two important differences. First, we allowed non-uniform interaction rates of strategies to account for the possibility that some interactions between male strategies are disproportionately more frequent than others. Second, we allowed females to exhibit a preference for one type of male and thereby choose mates adaptively. Selection dynamics were modeled using coupled replicator equations. The model confirms that there is a broad range of conditions under which a male polymorphism will arise. We applied the model to understand the genetic polymorphism in adult male

Indexed as

alternative reproductive tacticasymmetric gamecharacter displacementMnais damselflypolymorphismreplicator dynamicssneakerterritorial

Identifiers

PMID39895950
PMCPMC11786120

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.