Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39885286›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2025

An artificial insurance framework for a hydrogen-based microgrid to detect the advanced cyberattack model.

Mahan Fakhrooeian, Ali Basem, Mohammad Mahdi Gholami, Nahal Iliaee, Alireza Mohammadi Amidi, Amin Heydarian Hamzehkanloo, Akbar Karimipouya

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

7 authors.

Mahan FakhrooeianInstitute for Electrical Machines, Traction and Drives, Technische Universität Braunschweig, 38106, Braunschweig, Germany.
Ali BasemAir Conditioning Engineering Department, College of Engineering, University of Warith Al-Anbiyaa, Karbala, Iraq.
Mohammad Mahdi GholamiFaculty of Electrical Engineering, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran.
Nahal IliaeeDepartment of Electronics, Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada.
Alireza Mohammadi AmidiDepartment of Electrical Engineering, Razi University of Kermanshah, Kermanshah, Iran. Alireza.moamidi@gmail.com.
Amin Heydarian HamzehkanlooDepartment of Mechanical Engineering, Mashhad Branch, Islamic Azad University, Mashhad, Iran.
Akbar KarimipouyaKhuzestan Water & Power Authority (KWPA), Ahvaz, Iran.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Microgrid systems have evolved based on renewable energies including wind, solar, and hydrogen to make the satisfaction of loads far from the main grid more flexible and controllable using both island- and grid-connected modes. Albeit microgrids can gain beneficial results in cost and energy schedules once operating in grid-connected mode, such systems are vulnerable to malicious attacks from the viewpoint of cybersecurity. With this in mind, this paper explores a novel advanced attack model named the false transferred data injection (FTDI) attack aiming to manipulatively alter the power flowing from the microgrid to the upstream grid to raise voltage usability probability. One crucial piece of information that the model uses to change the system and cause the greatest amount of damage while concealing the attacker's view is the voltage stability index. Saying that the power transaction between the microgrid and the upstream grid is within the broad scope of bilateral exchange at any given moment is noteworthy. Put otherwise, with respect to the FTDI assault, the microgrid's power direction is just as significant to the detection system as the transferred power value. Therefore, once the microgrid is running in the grid-connected mode, the false data detector needs to concurrently detect changes in the value and direction of power. To overcome this problem, the paper presents a learning generative network model, based on the generative adversarial network (GAN) paradigm, to recognize the change in probability values that is maliciously aimed. To this end, a studied microgrid system including the wind turbine, photovoltaic, storage, tidal turbine, and fuel cell units is performed on the tested 24-bus IEEE grid to satisfy the local load demands. Comparative analysis indicates notable gains, such as scores of 0.95%, 0.92%, 0.7%, and 10% for the Hit rate, C.R. rate, F.A. rate, and Miss rate in order to evaluate the GAN-based detection model within the microgrid.

Indexed as

CyberattackDetection modelGAN MethodMicrogridRenewable energy unit

Identifiers

PMID39885286
PMCPMC11782640

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.