ArticleProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America2025
Governing in the face of a global crisis: When do voters punish and reward incumbent governments?
Article in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
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Who cites it
1 citing paper in PubMed.
- Governing in the face of a global crisis: When do voters punish and reward incumbent governments?Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America · 2025Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
The recent COVID-19 pandemic offers a rare opportunity to understand how citizens attribute responsibility for governments' responses to unanticipated negative-and in this case, systemic-exogenous shocks. Classical accounts of responsibility are complicated when crises are pervasive, involve multiple valence dimensions, and where individuals can make relative assessments of performance. We fielded a conjoint experiment in 16 countries with 22,147 respondents. In this experiment, subjects made re-election decisions regarding 178,184 randomly assigned incumbent profiles. We find that incumbents' performance along both health and economic dimensions drives these hypothetical reelection decisions. Using machine learning techniques, we find only muted heterogeneity in the magnitude and distribution of these treatment effects. This result suggests that these widely reported performance signals have consistent political effects across countries. In a complementary analysis, we also find that subjects' intentions to vote for incumbent governments are positively correlated with subjective and relative evaluations of the government's pandemic performance, along both health and economic dimensions. These results provide consistent evidence that evaluations of pandemic performance matter politically.
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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.