Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39822238›Full record

ArticleHealth affairs scholar2025

How do hospitals exert market power? Evidence from health systems and commercial health plan prices.

Suhui Evelyn Li, David Jones, Eugene Rich, Aimee Lansdale

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Health affairs scholar, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 4 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
4citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

4 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Review
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4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Suhui Evelyn LiMathematica, Princeton, NJ 08540, United States.
David JonesMathematica, Princeton, NJ 08540, United States.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4426-7084
Eugene RichMathematica, Princeton, NJ 08540, United States.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4973-8607
Aimee LansdaleMathematica, Princeton, NJ 08540, United States.ORCID https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4661-8693

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Consolidation of independent hospitals and physician practices into integrated health systems has reshaped the delivery of health care. While the literature suggests that provider consolidation raises prices, few studies have examined the interplay of health systems and insurers in relation to prices. Using negotiated price data that commercial insurers recently released under the Transparency in Coverage Final Rule, we examined the association between hospital concentration under health systems and prices for outpatient procedures in local health care markets with different levels of insurer concentration. We found that hospital prices are higher in more concentrated hospital markets, while lower in more concentrated insurer markets. However, the negative relationship between insurer concentration and hospital prices is attenuated in highly concentrated hospital markets, suggesting that insurers' bargaining leverage is lessened at greater levels of hospital consolidation. Considering the continued consolidation among hospitals and vertical integration of physician practices into health systems, our findings suggest that commercial payers may encounter increased challenges in controlling health care spending for their beneficiaries as providers' bargaining power continues to grow.

Indexed as

commercial insurershealth systemshospitalsmarket concentrationnegotiated prices

Identifiers

PMID39822238
PMCPMC11736714

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.