Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39819661›Full record

Trial reportBMJ global health2025

Doctors taking bribes from pharmaceutical companies is common and not substantially reduced by an educational intervention: a pragmatic randomised controlled trial in Pakistan.

Mishal Khan, Muhammad Naveed Noor, Afifah Rahman-Shepherd, Amna Rehana Siddiqui, Sabeen Sharif Khan, Nina van der Mark, Afshan Khurshid Isani, Ahson Q Siddiqi, Charles Opondo, Faisal Ziauddin and 13 more

Abstract readPragmatic Clinical Trial
In one paragraph

Trial report in BMJ global health, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Expectations Shaped Elsewhere: Refugee Experiences of Healthcare in Aotearoa New Zealand.Health expectations : an international journal of public participation in health care and health policy · 2026
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

23 authors.

Mishal KhanFaculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK mishal.khan@lshtm.ac.uk.
Muhammad Naveed NoorDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Afifah Rahman-ShepherdFaculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8845-9275
Amna Rehana SiddiquiJinnah Sindh Medical University, APPNA Institute of Public Health, Karachi, Pakistan.
Sabeen Sharif KhanDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Nina van der MarkFaculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK.ORCID http://orcid.org/0009-0005-7976-7638
Afshan Khurshid IsaniHealth Department, Government of Sindh, Karachi, Pakistan.
Ahson Q SiddiqiSindh Healthcare Commission, Karachi, Pakistan.
Charles OpondoDepartment of Medical Statistics, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine Faculty of Epidemiology and Population Health, London, UK.
Faisal ZiauddinDepartment of Medicine, Ziauddin University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Faiza BhuttoSindh Healthcare Commission, Karachi, Pakistan.
Iqbal AzamDepartment of Community Health Sciences, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Johanna HanefeldFaculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9487-2333
Natasha AliDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Robyna Irshad KhanDepartment of Anaesthesiology, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Syed Ahmed Raza KazmiSindh Healthcare Commission, Karachi, Pakistan.
Virginia WisemanFaculty of Public Health and Policy, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0002-7911-0741
Wafa AftabDepartment of Community Health Sciences, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Zafar MirzaSchool of Universal Health Coverage, Professor of Health Systems at Shifa Tameer-i-Millat University, Islamabad, Pakistan.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9159-8869
Zainab HasanSindh Healthcare Commission, Karachi, Pakistan.
Sameen SiddiqiDepartment of Community Health Sciences, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0001-8289-0964
Rumina HasanDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.
Sadia ShakoorDepartment of Pathology and Laboratory Medicine, Aga Khan University, Karachi, Pakistan.

Funding

Wellcome Trust
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

introductionIncentive-linked prescribing, which is when healthcare providers accept incentives from pharmaceutical companies for prescribing promoted medicines, is a form of bribery that harms patients and health systems globally. We developed a novel method using data collectors posing as pharmaceutical company sales representatives to evaluate private doctors' engagement in incentive-linked prescribing and the impact of a multifaceted educational intervention on reducing this practice in Karachi, Pakistan.

methodsWe made a sampling frame of all doctors running for-profit, primary-care clinics and randomly allocated participants to control and intervention groups (1:1). The intervention group received a multifaceted seminar on ethical prescribing and reinforcement messages over 6 weeks. The control group attended a seminar without mention of ethical prescribing. The primary outcome was the proportion of participants agreeing to accept incentives in exchange for prescribing promoted medicines from data collectors posing as pharmaceutical company representatives, 3 months after the seminars.

resultsWe enrolled 419 of 440 eligible participants. Of 210 participants randomly allocated to the intervention group, 135 (64%) attended the intervention seminar and of 209 participants allocated to the control group, 132 (63%) attended the placebo seminar. The primary outcome was assessed in 130 (96%) and 124 (94%) of intervention and control participants, respectively. No participants detected the covert data collectors. 52 control group doctors (41.9%) agreed to accept incentives as compared with 42 intervention group doctors (32.3%). After adjusting for doctors' age, sex and clinic district, there was no evidence of the intervention's impact on the primary outcome (OR 0.70 [95% CI 0.40 to 1.20], p=0.192).

conclusionsThis first study to covertly assess deal-making between doctors and pharmaceutical company representatives demonstrated that the practice is strikingly widespread in the study setting and suggested that substantial reductions are unlikely to be achieved by educational interventions alone. Our novel method provides an opportunity to generate evidence on deal-making between doctors and pharmaceutical companies elsewhere.

Indexed as

Drug IndustryPhysiciansPractice Patterns, Physicians'AdultFemaleHumansMaleMiddle AgedMotivationPakistanPrimary Health CareHealth systemsPublic Health

Identifiers

PMID39819661
PMCPMC11789533

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.