Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39743684›Full record

ArticleSociology of health & illness2025

The Political Sociology of NICE: Investigating Pharmaceutical Cost-Effectiveness Regulation in the UK.

John Abraham, Gowree Balendran

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Sociology of health & illness, 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Editorial: Health and illness interactions.Frontiers in sociology · 2025
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

2 authors.

John AbrahamDepartment of Medical Education, Brighton and Sussex Universities Medical School (BSMS), Brighton, UK.ORCID 0000-0003-0643-0274
Gowree BalendranDepartment of Global Health and Social Medicine, King's College London, London, UK.ORCID 0009-0006-5783-1472

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

The National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) was established a quarter of a century ago in 1999 to regulate the cost-effectiveness of pharmaceuticals (and other health technologies) for the NHS. Drawing on medical sociology theories of corporate bias, neoliberalism, pluralism/polycentricity and regulatory capture, the purpose of this article is to examine the applicability of those theories to NICE as a key regulatory agency in the UK health system. Based on approximately 7 years of documentary research, interviews with expert informants and observations of NICE-related meetings, this paper focuses particularly on NICE's relationship with the interests of the pharmaceutical industry compared with other stakeholder interests at the meso-organisational level. Consideration of the interaction between the UK Government and the pharmaceutical industry in relation to NICE is presented together with the analysis of revolving doors and conflicts of interest of NICE experts/advisors. The nature of policy changes over time (e.g. accelerated assessment pathways and industry fees for regulatory appraisals) and how they relate to the relevant stakeholder interests is also investigated. It is concluded that NICE is largely characterised by neoliberal corporate bias, though some elements of its organisation are also consistent with theories of capture, pluralism and polycentricity.

Indexed as

Cost-Benefit AnalysisDrug IndustryPoliticsState MedicineConflict of InterestHealth PolicyHumansUnited Kingdom

Identifiers

PMID39743684
PMCPMC11693927

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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.