ArticleFrontiers in psychiatry2024
Spontaneous theory of mind in autism: are anticipatory gaze and reaction time biases consistent?
Article in Frontiers in psychiatry, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
0 citing papers in PubMed.
No citing paper in PubMed yet.
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
6 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Background: Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) exhibit persistent deficits in social interaction and communication in adulthood. Pioneering studies have suggested that these difficulties arise from a lack of immediate, spontaneous mentalizing (i.e., theory of mind: ToM), specifically, an ability to attribute false beliefs to others, which should be usually acquired during neurotypical development. However, this view has been challenged by recent reports of nonreplications of spontaneous mentalizing, even in neurotypical adults. Objectives: We aimed to evaluate (1) whether measurements of spontaneous ToM in two representative paradigms, gaze bias in the anticipatory looking (AL) test and reaction time bias in the object detection (OD) test, are correlated in neurotypical adults and (2) whether these two measurements are altered in individuals with ASD. Methods: We developed a novel hybridized spontaneous false belief test combining the AL and OD paradigms to enable within-subject comparison of different spontaneous ToM measurements. Results: The results obtained with our hybridized test replicated the earlier positive evidence for spontaneous ToM in both AL and OD paradigms. Our results also revealed a correlation between the participants' spontaneous gaze bias in the AL paradigm and reaction time bias in the OD paradigm, indicating that the participants who had spontaneously anticipated other's false belief driven actions more quickly detected the object. We further found that spontaneous gaze and reaction time biases were altered in individuals with ASD. Finally, we ascertained those inclusions of these biases as diagnostic variables in a regression model improved the accuracy of diagnosing ASD. ASD diagnosis was best predicted by the model when variables obtained from both AL and OD methods were included in the model. Conclusions/implications: Our hybridized paradigm not only replicated spontaneous gaze bias in early AL studies and reaction time bias in the OD paradigms, but indicated significant correlation between them, suggesting that different implicit tasks tap the same spontaneous ToM in neurotypical adults. Group differences of these indices between ASD and neurotypical adult groups indicated that our task could help diagnose ASD, which is essential for evaluating the social difficulties that individuals with ASD face in adulthood.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.