Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39604004›Full record

ArticleCerebral cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991)2025

On the bright side of blindsight. Considerations from new observations of awareness in a blindsight patient.

Beatrice de Gelder, Nicholas Humphrey, Alan J Pegna

Abstract readCase Reports
In one paragraph

Article in Cerebral cortex (New York, N.Y. : 1991), 2025. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 3 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
3citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

3 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. Article
  3. Phenomenal consciousness: its scope and limits.Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences · 2025
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Beatrice de GelderDepartment of Cognitive Neuroscience, Maastricht University, Oxfordlaan 55, 6229 EV Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Nicholas HumphreyDarwin College, Silver Street, Cambridge, CB3 9EU, United Kingdom.
Alan J PegnaSchool of Psychology, University of Queensland, 24 Campbell Rd, St Lucia QLD 4067, Australia.

Funding

European Research Council 856495Horizon 2020 Program H2020-FETPROACT-2020-2 101017884Horizon-CL4-2021-Human-01-21 101070278
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Blindsight refers to the ability to make accurate visual discriminations without conscious awareness of the stimuli. In this study, we present new evidence from naturalistic observations of a patient with bilateral damage to the striate cortex, who surprisingly demonstrated the ability to detect colored objects, particularly red ones. Despite the slow and effortful process, the patient reported full awareness of the color aspect of the stimuli. These observations cannot be explained by traditional concepts of type 1 or type 2 blindsight, raising intriguing questions about the boundaries between objective and subjective blindness, as well as the nature of visual experience and epistemic agency. Moreover, these findings underscore the significant role that blindsight could play in future research, especially in understanding how higher cortical functions are involved in emotions and feelings. This highlights the necessity for further exploration to better understand the visual features that contribute to the phenomenon of affective blindsight.

Indexed as

AwarenessBlindnessColor PerceptionHumansMaleMiddle AgedPhotic StimulationVisual CortexVisual Perceptionblindsightcolor processingconsciousnesscortical blindnesshemianopiaresidual vision

Identifiers

PMID39604004
PMCPMC11712267

What OpenQuestion holds

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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.