ArticlePNAS nexus2024
Partisan belief in new misinformation is resistant to accuracy incentives.
Article in PNAS nexus, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.
What it found
Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.
The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
1 citing paper in PubMed.
- Changing beliefs or changing behavior? Understanding the belief-to-behavior process and intervening to curb the impact of misinformation.Journal of consumer psychology : the official journal of the Society for Consumer Psychology · 2026Article
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
One explanation for why people accept ideologically welcome misinformation is that they are insincere. Consistent with the insincerity hypothesis, past experiments have demonstrated that bias in the veracity assessment of publicly reported statistics and debunked news headlines often diminishes considerably when accuracy is incentivized. Many statements encountered online, however, constitute previously unseen claims that are difficult to evaluate the veracity of. We hypothesize that when confronted with unfamiliar content, unsure partisans will form sincere beliefs that are ideologically aligned. Across three experimental studies, 1,344 conservative and liberal US participants assessed the veracity of 20 politically sensitive statements that either confirmed or contradicted social science evidence only known to experts. As hypothesized, analyses show that incentives failed to correct most ideological differences in the perceived veracity of statements. Sixty six to 78% of partisan differences in accuracy assessment persisted even when monetary stakes were raised beyond levels in prior studies. Participants displayed a surprising degree of confidence in their erroneous beliefs, as bias was not reduced when participants could safely avoid rating statements they were unsure about, without monetary loss. These findings suggest limits to the ability of disciplining interventions to reduce the expression of false statements, because many of the targeted individuals sincerely believe them to be true.
Indexed as
Identifiers
What OpenQuestion holds
Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.