ArticlePNAS nexus2024
Continued influence of false accusations in forming impressions of political candidates.
Article in PNAS nexus, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.
What it found
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
The trial behind it
Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.
Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.
Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed.
Corrections and comments
PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.
Authors and funding
4 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
Previous work has shown that false information affects decision-making even after being corrected, a phenomenon known as "continued influence effects" (CIEs). Using mock social media posts about fictional political candidates, we observe robust within-participant CIEs: candidates targeted by corrected accusations are rated more poorly than candidates not targeted by allegations. These effects occur both immediately and after as much as a 2-day delay. We further demonstrate that vulnerability to CIEs in a political context varies systematically between individuals. We found that certain groups are more susceptible to CIEs on immediate candidate ratings (i) those who rely more on intuitive feelings, (ii) those with lower digital literacy knowledge, and (iii) younger individuals. These individuals' judgments appear to be relatively more influenced by the refuted accusations and/or less influenced by the factual refutations. Interestingly, political orientation did not affect CIEs, despite its influence on explicitly identifying misinformation. Moreover, people recalled accusation stimuli better than refutations at a delay, suggesting that emotions may drive the prioritized processing of accusations. Our results indicate that analytic thinking could be protective when people judge political candidates targeted by refuted false information.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.