ArticlePloS one2024
Optimal strategies for contract farming supply chain with government subsidies under e-commerce assistance to farmers.
Article in PloS one, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.
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The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.
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Who cites it
2 citing papers in PubMed.
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Authors and funding
2 authors.
Funding
No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.
Abstract
The agricultural issue is a focal point of concern for each country, and e-commerce assistance to farmers, as an emerging model, is gaining increasing attention. Considering this trend, this paper bases on e-commerce assistance to farmers and considers four types of government subsidies: no subsidy, price subsidy model with the farmer as the subsidy target, price subsidy model with the e-commerce platform as the subsidy target, and area subsidy model. Based on this, a game model of the contract farming supply chain involving a farmer and an e-commerce platform was established to explore the optimal decision-making in the contract farming supply chain considering various government subsidies under the background of e-commerce assistance to farmers. The results indicate that: (1) Consumer preference for supporting farmers and consumer premiums can stimulate the farmer to expand farm size, increase agricultural production, increase the purchase price of agricultural products and promote the growth of profits for the farmer and the e-commerce platform, contributing to the growth of social welfare. Output volatility can lead to a decrease in farm size and a reduction in the purchase price of agricultural products. (2) Government subsidies can support the farmer in expanding farm size and contribute to increased profits for the farmer and the e-commerce platform. However, government subsidies do not universally have a positive impact on every variable. The influence of government subsidies on the purchase price of agricultural products is contingent upon the method of subsidy distribution. Similarly, the effects of government subsidies on social welfare are influenced by factors such as price elasticity and agricultural productions per unit area. (3) From the perspectives of farm size, the purchase price of agricultural products, and profits of the farmer and the e-commerce platform, the government will have different and more targeted subsidy models, and the corresponding subsidy models are influenced by the agricultural productions per unit area. The research conclusion can provide references for optimal decision-making in contract farming under the model of e-commerce assistance to farmers.
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Registered trials
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