ArticlePloS one2024
The effect of CEO's compensation in driving corporate ESG greenwashing: Evidence from China.
Article in PloS one, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Not yet cited in PubMed.
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
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Abstract
This study examines the relationship between CEO compensation schemes and ESG greenwashing behavior in Chinese listed firms during the period 2013-2022. We find that a CEO's cash (equity) compensation has a significantly positive (negative) correlation with corporate ESG greenwashing behavior. From mechanism analysis, consistent with the agency problem view, firms engage in more severe ESG greenwashing behavior under a higher proportion of cash in the CEO compensation structure. Such distortion behavior is mitigated by higher internal control quality in firms having an equity incentive for their CEO under the convergence of interest viewpoint. Additional analysis reveals that corporates audited by large accounting firms and those with more media coverage exacerbate the positive correlation between CEO cash compensation and ESG greenwashing behavior, while government environmental regulations reinforce the inhibitory effect of CEO equity compensation on ESG greenwashing. Our results imply that different CEO compensation schemes can have opposite effects on limiting firms' ESG greenwashing behavior in the Chinese context. Furthermore, we highlight that the question of form over substance principle to certain external governance mechanisms, leading CEO to exacerbate impression management of ESG disclosure.
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Registered trials
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