Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39372508›Full record

ReviewApplied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association2024

Biosecurity Assessments for Emerging Transdisciplinary Biotechnologies: Revisiting Biodefense in an Age of Synthetic Biology.

Diane DiEuliis, Michael J Imperiale, Kavita M Berger

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 6 papers, 1 of them a synthesis that pooled it.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
6citing papers in PubMed, 1 pooled it
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

6 citing papers in PubMed, 1 synthesis or guideline pooled it.

  1. Pooled it
  2. Article
  3. Principal Investigator Responsibility for Flagging Research with Dual-Use or Pandemic Risk.Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association · 2025
    Article
  4. Review
  5. Why implementation gaps could undermine synthetic nucleic acid oversight.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2025
    Article
  6. Grand challenge in biosafety and biosecurity.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2024
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Diane DiEuliisCenter for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction, National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA.
Michael J ImperialeUniversity of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA.
Kavita M BergerBoard on Life Sciences, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Washington, DC, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Introduction: Rapid advances in biotechnologies and transdisciplinary research are enhancing the ability to perform full-scale engineering of biology, contributing to worldwide efforts to create bioengineered plants, medicines, and commodities, which promise sustainability and innovative properties. Objective: This rapidly evolving biotechnology landscape is prompting focused scrutiny on biosecurity frameworks in place to mitigate harmful exploitation of biotechnology by state and non-state actors. Concerns about biosafety and biosecurity of engineering biology research have existed for decades as views about how advances in this and associated fields might provide new capabilities to malicious actors. This article considers biosecurity concerns using examples of research advances in engineering biology. Methods: The authors explore risk assessment and mitigation of transdisciplinary biotechnology research and development, using the framework developed in the National Academies' study on Results: The Synthetic Biology Assessment Framework focuses on risks of using advanced approaches and technologies to enhance or create novel pathogens and toxins. The field of engineering biology continues to advance at a pace that challenges current risk assessment frameworks. Conclusions: This framework likely is sufficient to assess new science and technology advances affecting conventional biological agents. However, the risk assessment framework may have limited applicability for technologies that are not usable with conventional biological agents and result in economic or broader national security concerns. Finally, the vast majority of discourse has been focused primarily on risks rather than benefits, and analyzing both in future evaluations is critical to balancing scientific progress with risk reduction.

Indexed as

biohybridbiological securityengineering biologygenerative artificial intelligencemicrobiomesynthetic biology

Identifiers

PMID39372508
PMCPMC11447134

What OpenQuestion holds

Textmetadata
LicenceCC BY
Read underepoch 390

Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.