Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39358716›Full record

ArticleGlobalization and health2024

Protecting whose welfare? A document analysis of competition regulatory decisions in four jurisdictions across three harmful consumer product industries.

Benjamin Wood, Chrissa Karouzakis, Katherine Sievert, Sven Gallasch, Gary Sacks

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Globalization and health, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

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Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

5 authors.

Benjamin WoodGlobal Centre for Preventive Health and Nutrition, Institute for Health Transformation, School of Health and Social Development, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Victoria, 3125, Australia. b.wood@deakin.edu.au.
Chrissa KarouzakisDeakin Law School, Deakin University, Burwood, 221 Burwood Highway, Victoria, 3125, Australia.
Katherine SievertGlobal Centre for Preventive Health and Nutrition, Institute for Health Transformation, School of Health and Social Development, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Victoria, 3125, Australia.
Sven GallaschDeakin Law School, Deakin University, Burwood, 221 Burwood Highway, Victoria, 3125, Australia.
Gary SacksGlobal Centre for Preventive Health and Nutrition, Institute for Health Transformation, School of Health and Social Development, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Burwood, Victoria, 3125, Australia.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

BACKGROUND AND

methodsCompetition regulation has a strong influence on the relative market power of firms. As such, competition regulation can complement industry-specific measures designed to address harms associated with excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries. This study aimed to examine, through a public health lens, assessments and decisions made by competition authorities in four jurisdictions (Australia, South Africa, the United States (US), and the European Union (EU)) involving three harmful consumer product industries (alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, tobacco). We analysed legal case documents, sourced from online public registers and dating back as far as the online records extended, using a narrative approach. Regulatory decisions and harms described by the authorities were inductively coded, focusing on the affected group(s) (e.g., consumers) and the nature of the harms (e.g., price increases) identified.

resultsWe identified 359 cases published by competition authorities in Australia (n = 202), South Africa (n = 44), the US (n = 27), and the EU (n = 86). Most cases (n = 239) related to mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Competition authorities in Australia, the US, and the EU were found to make many decisions oriented towards increasing the affordability and accessibility of alcohol beverages, soft drinks, and tobacco products. Such decisions were very often made despite the presence of consumption-reduction public health policies. In comparison, South Africa's competition authorities routinely considered broader issues, including 'Black Economic Empowerment' and potential harms to workers.

conclusionMany of the competition regulatory decisions assessed likely facilitated the concentration of market power in the industries we explored. Nevertheless, there appears to be potential for competition regulatory frameworks to play a more prominent role in promoting and protecting the public's health through tighter regulation of excessive market power in harmful consumer product industries.

Indexed as

Economic CompetitionEuropean UnionAlcoholic BeveragesAustraliaCarbonated BeveragesDecision MakingDocument AnalysisHumansPublic HealthSouth AfricaTobacco IndustryUnited StatesCommercial determinants of healthCompetition policyConsumer welfareHealth in all policiesIndustrial epidemicsMarket power

Identifiers

PMID39358716
PMCPMC11448300

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

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Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.