ArticleSensors (Basel, Switzerland)2024
Detection of GPS Spoofing Attacks in UAVs Based on Adversarial Machine Learning Model.
Article in Sensors (Basel, Switzerland), 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 6 papers.
What it found
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Who cites it
6 citing papers in PubMed.
- Evaluation and telemetry-based detection of GPS spoofing effects on UAV navigation using software-defined radio.Scientific reports · 2026Article
- Tri-stream multi-model architecture for real-time detection of BeiDou signal manipulation in UAV swarms.Scientific reports · 2026Article
- Multi-Layer AI Sensor System for Real-Time GPS Spoofing Detection and Encrypted UAS Control.Sensors (Basel, Switzerland) · 2026Article
- Security of ADS-B and Remote ID Systems: Cyberattacks, Detection Techniques, and Countermeasures.Sensors (Basel, Switzerland) · 2026Review
- A Physics-Informed Residual and Particle Swarm Optimization Framework for Physics-Informed UAV GPS Spoofing Detection.Sensors (Basel, Switzerland) · 2025Article
- Adversarial Evasion Attacks on SVM-Based GPS Spoofing Detection Systems.Sensors (Basel, Switzerland) · 2025Article
Corrections and comments
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Authors and funding
3 authors.
Funding
Abstract
Advancements in wireless communication and automation have revolutionized mobility systems, notably through autonomous vehicles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). UAV spatial coordinates, determined via Global Positioning System (GPS) signals, are susceptible to cyberattacks due to unencrypted and unauthenticated transmissions with GPS spoofing being a significant threat. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) for UAVs have been developed and enhanced using machine learning (ML) algorithms. However, Adversarial Machine Learning (AML) has introduced new risks by exploiting ML models. This study presents a UAV-IDS employing AML methodology to enhance the detection and classification of GPS spoofing attacks. The key contribution is the development of an AML detection model that significantly improves UAV system robustness and security. Our findings indicate that the model achieves a detection accuracy of 98%, demonstrating its effectiveness in managing large-scale datasets and complex tasks. This study emphasizes the importance of physical layer security for enhancing IDSs in UAVs by introducing a novel detection model centered on an adversarial training defense method and advanced deep learning techniques.
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Registered trials
Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.