Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39263047›Full record

ArticleHeliyon2024

Research on platform data security governance strategy based on three-party evolutionary game.

Zhen Tian, Meng Han, Chuchu Jiang

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Heliyon, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 1 paper.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
1citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

1 citing paper in PubMed.

  1. Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Zhen TianZhengzhou University of Light Industry, School of Economics and Management, China.
Meng HanZhengzhou University of Light Industry, School of Economics and Management, China.
Chuchu JiangZhengzhou University of Light Industry, School of Economics and Management, China.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

With the implementation of the overall national security concept, data security governance rises to a new strategic height. In this paper, for the incomplete status quo of digital service platforms, third-party testing organizations and government regulators in the construction of digital security, an evolutionary game model based on the above three parties is constructed. The model examines the strategic decision-making process, behavioral influences, and evolutionary stability of the three players, and is simulated and analyzed using MATLAB. The results show that the evolutionary system will reach the ideal stable state

Indexed as

Digital ecologyDigital security governanceEvolutionary game modelSimulation analysis

Identifiers

PMID39263047
PMCPMC11385774

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY-NC
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.