Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39191807›Full record

ArticleScientific reports2024

Poorer representation of minds underpins less accurate mental state inference for out-groups.

Bryony Payne, Geoffrey Bird, Caroline Catmur

Abstract read
In one paragraph

Article in Scientific reports, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 2 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
2citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

2 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Feedback on Mental State Inferences Improves Accuracy and Awareness.Quarterly journal of experimental psychology (2006) · 2026
    Article
  2. Anti-social learning: The impact of language on mentalizing.British journal of psychology (London, England : 1953) · 2025
    Article
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

3 authors.

Bryony PayneDepartment of Psychology, King's College London, London, UK. bryony.payne@kcl.ac.uk.
Geoffrey BirdDepartment of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK.
Caroline CatmurDepartment of Psychology, King's College London, London, UK.

Funding

John Templeton Foundation 61824
6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Societies are becoming more polarised, driven in part by misconceptions about out-groups' beliefs. To understand these effects, one must examine the cognitive processes underlying how people think about others. Here, we investigate whether people are less prone to theorise about the minds of out-groups, or less able to do so. Participants (Study 1: n = 128; Study 2: n = 128) made inferences about social and political beliefs held by real in-group and out-group members, and could choose to receive further information to improve these inferences. Results show: (1) participants sought equivalent or greater information about out-groups relative to in-groups; but despite this, (2) made significantly less accurate inferences for out-groups; and (3) were significantly less aware of their reduced ability. This shows that poorer mental state inference is not underpinned by a reduced propensity to consider out-group minds, but instead by a worse representation of the minds of out-groups.

Indexed as

CognitionAdolescentAdultFemaleHumansMaleMiddle AgedPoliticsTheory of MindYoung AdultGroup membershipMentalisingMental state inferenceOut-groupsTheory of mind

Identifiers

PMID39191807
PMCPMC11349750

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY-NC-ND
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.