Evidence map›Paper›PMID 39144102›Full record

ReviewApplied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association2024

Enhancing Gene Synthesis Security: An Updated Framework for Synthetic Nucleic Acid Screening and the Responsible Use of Synthetic Biological Materials.

Curtis Matthew Sharkey, Mariam Lekveishvili, Tricia de la Rosa, Katheen Danskin

Abstract readReview
In one paragraph

Review in Applied biosafety : journal of the American Biological Safety Association, 2024. The graph could read no effect estimate from its abstract, so it casts no vote on the map. Cited by 6 papers.

0numbers the graph read from it
0cells of the map it votes in
6citing papers in PubMed
–field-weighted citation impact
1 · What the graph read from it

What it found

Each row is one number read from the abstract, on the scale the paper reported it, with its interval. Left of the dashed line favours the treatment, right favours the comparator. Under each row is the sentence it came from. New to these charts? A ten-minute tutorial.

The abstract states no effect estimate the extractor could read, or names no intervention and outcome on the map, so this paper lights no cell and moves no belief. It is still indexed, cited and linked below.

2 · The registry

The trial behind it

Trials whose registry record cites this paper, or whose number appears in the abstract. A trial that started after this paper was published is citing it as background, not reporting it.

Neither the registry nor the abstract names a trial number. If this is a trial report, that itself is worth knowing.

3 · Its place in the literature

Who cites it

6 citing papers in PubMed.

  1. Article
  2. The evolution of the United States nucleic acid screening policies.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026
    Review
  3. ADAPT: a programme for the advanced detection of AI-enabled pathogenic threats.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026
    Article
  4. A risk-based framework to guide oversight of nucleic acid constructs.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2026
    Article
  5. Why implementation gaps could undermine synthetic nucleic acid oversight.Frontiers in bioengineering and biotechnology · 2025
    Article
  6. Review
4 · The record

Corrections and comments

PubMed lists nothing against this paper. Absence here is not a guarantee, only a check that was made.

5 · Who and what money

Authors and funding

4 authors.

Curtis Matthew SharkeyStrategy Division, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Requirements, Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, District of Columbia, USA.
Mariam LekveishviliStrategy Division, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Requirements, Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, District of Columbia, USA.ORCID https://orcid.org/0009-0001-6919-4750
Tricia de la RosaThriving Environments, San Diego, California, USA.
Katheen DanskinStrategy Division, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Requirements, Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Washington, District of Columbia, USA.

Funding

No grant is acknowledged in the PubMed record.

6 · The paper itself

Abstract

Introduction: In response to continuous advancements in synthetic biotechnologies and in the availability of synthetic nucleic acids to the biological research community since the publication of the 2010 HHS synthetic double-stranded DNA (dsDNA) screening framework, the U.S. government undertook a comprehensive and stakeholder-driven review and revision process. This culminated in the publication of a new screening framework for synthetic nucleic acids in October 2023, followed by an Executive Order directing departments and agencies of the U.S. government to take certain measures in support of implementing the screening framework. This review provides an overview of the process by which stakeholder comments were considered and by which the 2023 screening framework was drafted. A summary of expected impacts on the life sciences research community is also provided. Methods: Comments were solicited from synthetic biology stakeholders through the publication of two Discussion and Conclusion: The adoption of the 2023 screening framework, and related provisions in the Executive Order that followed, will impact researchers and biosafety officers across the U.S. bioeconomy. For instance, this screening framework is no longer limited in its recommendations to providers of synthetic dsDNA containing sequences unique to regulated pathogens or toxins, but now includes recommendations to all entities involved in the sale, use, and transfer of all forms of synthetic nucleic acids encoding genetic sequences that contribute to pathogenicity or toxicity-whether from regulated agents or not. Biosafety professionals are emerging as a critical resource for establishing and fostering a culture of biosecurity surrounding synthetic nucleic acids containing these high consequence genetic sequences. Significance: The work presented is significant because the scope of the 2010 screening framework has been expanded to include roles and responsibilities for new entities across the life sciences research landscape. This will likely impact biosafety professionals, who may be well positioned in their institutions to coordinate these new responsibilities.

Indexed as

biosecurityScreening Framework Guidancesequences of concernsynthetic dsDNAsynthetic nucleic acids

Identifiers

PMID39144102
PMCPMC11319848

What OpenQuestion holds

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LicenceCC BY
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Registered trials

None linked

Read under generation 80e0d062 · epoch 390. Bibliography from PubMed, PubMed Central and OpenAlex; grants from NIH RePORTER; trial links from ClinicalTrials.gov; estimates, votes and beliefs from the OpenQuestion graph.